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A REPRESENTATIVE COPY OF THE FILING
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   Finney v. Nugent
    Case No. 04-55769
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SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Appellant hereby makes this formal Supplemental Request for Judicial
Notice under the Federal Rules of Evidence § 201.  Appellant respectfully
requests that this Court take Judicial Notice of easily verified facts concerning
continuing systemic disability discrimination in jury programs, services and
activities by the California court system pursuant to the executed NOTICE OF
JURY SERVICE/REQUEST FOR EXCUSE (8/11/2004) with 12/5/2003
Attachment, the San Diego Superior Court’s form letter denial and envelope
(8/26/2004), appellant’s response letter (9/3/2004), the executed NOTICE OF
JURY SERVICE/ REQUEST FOR EXCUSE with second original signature
(9/3/2004), and the San Diego Superior Court’s approval letter (9/9/2004) and
envelope (9/10/2004).
Appellees’ conspiracy to violate ADA Title II has been expanded both
vertically, to include the present Presiding Judge and Court Executive Officer,
and horizontally, to include the jury services program and jury commissioners/
administrators. 
Facial and as-applied disability discrimination, deliberate indifference,
discriminatory animus and retaliation by the California court system in the
administration of jury programs, services and activities is capable of repetition,
but has evaded review prior to appellant’s private attorney general civil action.  
The San Diego Superior Court has demonstrated a practice and pattern of
disability discrimination and retaliation confirmed by direct and circumstantial
evidence. 
These documents show appellees’ continuing discriminatory animus and
retaliation against appellant for petitioning the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
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Ninth Circuit.  In addition, appellees have violated sections of the California
Penal Code and California Code of Civil Procedure to conceal and otherwise
evade review of their systemic disability discrimination by the Ninth Circuit. 
“Cover-up” is an objective of all conspiracies and was unsuccessfully
attempted in 1996 by the Presiding Judge and two San Diego Superior Court
judges to conceal and otherwise evade review of bribery and conspiracy.  USA
v. Frega, No. 97-50100, 9th Cir., June 8, 1999.
This Supplemental Request for Judicial Notice is based upon this written
request, appellant’s declaration and the attached exhibits. 
DECLARATION OF JACQUELYN FINNEY IN SUPPORT OF
SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
     I, Jacquelyn Finney, declare as follows:
1.
I am the appellant pro se in this action.
2.
Attached to this Supplemental Request for Judicial Notice [designated as
Exhibit No. 1] is a true and correct copy of my executed Notice of Jury
Service/Request for Excuse, dated August 11, 2004, with attached letter
dated December 5, 2003.
3.
Attached to this Supplemental Request for Judicial Notice [designated as
Exhibit No. 2] is a true and correct copy of the San Diego Superior
Court’s form letter response, dated August 26, 2004, denying my
executed Request for Excuse, and the envelope in which it arrived. 
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   Finney v. Nugent
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4.
Attached to this Supplemental Request for Judicial Notice [designated as
Exhibit No. 3] is a true and correct copy of my letter dated September 3,
2004 in response to the San Diego Superior Court’s denial letter [Exhibit 
No. 2]. 
5.
Attached to this Supplemental Request for Judicial Notice [designated as 
      Exhibit No. 4] is a true and correct copy of my executed Notice of Jury     
      Service/Request for Excuse, dated September 3, 2004.
6.  Attached to this Supplemental Request for Judicial Notice [designated as
Exhibit No. 5] is a true and correct copy of the San Diego Superior 
Court’s letter dated September 9, 2004, approving my Request for
Excuse and the envelope postmarked September 10, 2004 in which it
arrived. 
7.  Appellees are easily able to provide authentication for Exhibits Nos. 2
and 6.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of
America and the State of California, that the foregoing is true and 
correct,
and that this declaration was executed in Encinitas, California on  
September 15, 2004.
     Jacquelyn Finney
______________________
(Type)
        Jacquelyn Finney
        Appellant, Pro Se
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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
Judicially noticeable matters, not otherwise included in the record on
appeal (initially or through supplementation) may, nonetheless, be considered
by the appellate court.  Even though neither filed with nor considered by the
district court, certain matters may be judicially noticed by the appellate court
(matters of common knowledge, of public record, which are readily verifiable). 
Broadly, appellate courts have the same power as trial courts to take judicial
notice of a matter properly subject to such notice.  [See FRE Rule 201; Papai
v. Harbor Tug & Barge Col, 67 F.3d 203, 207, fn. 5 (9th Cir. 1995); rev’d on
other grounds, 520 U.S. 548, 117 S. Ct. 1535 (1997)]
As with evidence generally, the matter to be judicially noticed must be 
relevant to the issues in the case.  [FRE Rule 402; Vallot v. Central Gulf Lines,
Inc.  (5th Cir. 1981) 641 F.2d 347, 350 (per curiam)].
A court may properly take notice of “matters of public record” to the
extent they are not subject to reasonable dispute.  Lee v. City of Los Angeles,
250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001).  This includes allegations made in pleadings
and other documents filed in other lawsuits.  BurbankGlendalePasadena
Airport Authority v. City of Burbank, 136 F.3d 1360, 1364 (9th Cir. 1998)
(taking judicial notice of pleadings filed in state court action).
The court may also take judicial notice of a “document the authenticity 
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of which is not contested, and upon which the plaintiff’s complaint necessarily 
relies.”  Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 706 (9th Cir. 1998).  This includes
documents that are integral to plaintiff’s claim but not explicitly incorporated 
into the complaint.  Van Buskirk v. CNN, 284 F.3d. 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002).
RELEVANCE
Appellant has presented substantial, undisputed evidence of a pattern of
historic, pervasive disability discrimination, deliberate indifference,
discriminatory animus and retaliation by the California court system which has
violated her constitutional rights to access and petition state courts and to serve
on a jury.  This evidence is consistent with and reflects the historical pattern of
systemic, pervasive disability discrimination in violation of the fundamental
right to access state courts, as a pro se attorney, litigant, witness and juror that
was confirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the U.S. Supreme
Court in Tennessee v. Lane, supra.
The California court system’s violations of ADA Title II are capable of
repetition and yet have evaded review, but for appellant’s pro se private
attorney general action, which was dismissed with prejudice by the district
court.  Private attorney general enforcement actions are permitted by ADA
Title II and encouraged by the DOJ, which expressly recognizes that its 
resources to enforce ADA are limited.  Newman v. Piggy Park Enters, Inc., 390 
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U.S. 400, 401-402 (1968).
Appellant has been denied the privilege of jury service due to the San
Diego Superior Court’s practice and pattern of disability discrimination,
deliberate indifference, discriminatory animus and retaliation in all its
programs, services and activities.  The San Diego Superior Court has now
violated the California Code of Civil Procedure and the California Penal Code
in an attempt to conceal and otherwise evade review of its illegal conduct by
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  
In his letter dated December 5, 2003, the Assistant Court Executive
stated that the San Diego Superior Court does not provide “…access as
contemplated by the ADA… due to the enormous budget crisis…”  In his letter
dated September 9, 2004, the Jury Services Manager stated that “The San
Diego Superior Court can and does comply with the Americans with
Disabilities Act…,” but he did not state that the Assistant Court Executive’s
statements were or are at present incorrect.  
The Jury Manager’s spoliation of jury service records and undertaking of
appellant’s official jury excuse denials and approvals absent jurisdiction, in the
context of the San Diego Superior Court’s practice and pattern of disability
discrimination and retaliation, serve to strip him and the Court of any
credibility whatsoever.  Appellant is still subject to CRC 989.3 as a juror. 
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Appellant has been subjected to additional coercion and retaliation for
exercising her rights and protections under the U.S. Constitution and ADA
Title II to petition the Ninth Circuit for relief from disability discrimination by
the California court system, its judges, court executives and jury
commissioners.  The Ninth Circuit has held that “…retaliation certainly
includes ‘instigating… or engaging in campaigns of harassment and
humiliation.’”  Lytle v. Clark County School District, No. 03-15126, 9th Cir.,
filed September 1, 2004, citing Coszalter  v. City of Salem 320 F.3d 968 at 976. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that “individual jurors subject to racial
exclusion have the legal right to bring suit on their own behalf.”  Powers v.
Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991), citing Carter v. Jury Commission, 396 U.S. 320
(1970) at 329-330.  “As a practical matter, however, these challenges are
rare… (emphasis supplied) the barriers to a suit are daunting… Unlike a
challenge to systematic practices of the jury clerk and commissioners, it would
be difficult for an individual juror to show a likelihood that discrimination
against him… will recur.”  Powers, Id. citing Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S.
95-110 (1983).
“And there exist considerable practical barriers to suit by the excluded
juror because of the small financial stake involved and the economic burdens
of litigation… the reality is that a juror dismissed because of race probably
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will leave the courtroom possessing little incentive to set in motion the arduous
process needed to vindicate his own rights.”  (emphasis supplied)  Powers, Id,
citing Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257.  
“The Fourteenth Amendment’s mandate that race discrimination be 
eliminated from all official acts and proceedings of the State is most 
compelling in the judicial system… The statutory prohibition on discrimination
in the selection of jurors… makes race-neutrality in jury selection a visible and
inevitable measure of the judicial system’s own commitment to the commands
of the Constitution.  The courts are under an affirmative duty to enforce the
strong statutory and constitutional policies embodied in that prohibition.” 
Powers, Id, citing Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 507-509.
The U.S. Supreme Court declared in Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978
(2004) that disability discrimination in state court jury programs, services and
activities is equally as repugnant to the Constitution as racial discrimination.
Pursuant to FRE § 201, appellant respectfully requests that this Court
take Judicial Notice of these documents and give them due weight in
consideration that:
“As a practical matter these challenges are rare… the barriers to 
a suit are daunting…  And there exist practical barriers to suit by
the excluded juror because of the small financial stake involved
and the economic burdens of litigation…”  Powers, supra.
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         The California Court system’s disability discrimination, which has
evaded review, has now been exposed and has been brought to this Court for
the first time by a pro se private attorney general.  As a practical matter, the
opportunity for this Court to provide systemic relief from systemic disability
discrimination for all disabled citizens of states within the Ninth Circuit’s 
jurisdiction will not recur.
Respectfully submitted,
Date: September 15, 2004
Jacquelyn Finney
________________________
       (Type)
         Jacquelyn Finney
         Appellant, Pro Se