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Reply to Opposition Motion for Protective Order, Order to Compel Testimony, Sanctions
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JACQUELYN FINNEY
Encinitas, CA 92024
In Pro Per
SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO
JACQUELYN FINNEY
Petitioner and Plaintiff,
v.
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF MANAGED
HEALTH CARE; DANIEL ZINGALE,
DIRECTOR; ANDREW GEORGE, SENIOR
STAFF COUNSEL, HMO HELP CENTER; DOES 1
- 100,
Respondent and Defendants
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Case No.: No. GIN024734
REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE
ORDER; FOR ORDER TO COMPEL
DEPOSITION TESTIMONY; FOR IMPOSITION
OF SANCTIONS; AND DEFENDANTS'
REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS
Date:    June 10, 2003
Time:   3:00 p.m.
Dept:    30
Judge:   Hon. Thomas P. Nugent
[Telephonic Ruling (760) 806-6050
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendants' oppressive abuse of the discovery process has caused plaintiff to file this motion, 
seeking the protection of the Court to ensure that defendants play by the rules. 
Plaintiff's motion reflects her frustration with and fear of defendants' coercive dismissal of
plaintiff's good faith offer to meet and confer to schedule the deposition of Secretary Maria Contreras-
Sweet per the terms and conditions of notice set forth pursuant to CCP in her March 18, 2003 letter.
(Plaintiff's Motion, Exhibit No. 1)
Defendants' attorneys have created a parallel universe, a legal "Wonderland" in which they seek
the Court's cooperation to put "sentence before verdict."  Plaintiff responds in Alice's words, i.e.:  
"I don't think they play at all fairly, and they don't seem to have any rules in particular, at least if
there are any, nobody attends to them... and you've no idea how confusing it is..."
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. Plaintiff Should Not Be Subject to Sanctions
On March 18, 2003 plaintiff sent a materially correct notice to defendants' attorney Sturdevant to
take the deposition of Secretary Contreras-Sweet, in compliance with and citing as her authorities, all
required sections of the California Code of Civil Procedure and Nagle.  
RECEIVED
2003 Jun 23  PM  12:58
   NORTH COUNTY DIVISION
       SAN DIEGO SUPERIOR COURT
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In a good faith effort to meet and confer, prior to sending a technical notice that would include
the negotiated date and time convenient to all parties (on the assumption that Ms. Sturdevant would act
to meet and confer in good faith to finalize details), plaintiff permitted defendants to select any date in
May, 2003.  In retrospect, plaintiff's trust in defendants' attorneys' adherence to the California Rules of
Professional Conduct was misplaced.  These attorneys' behavior follows a clearly established pattern of
violating plaintiff's rights from the submission of her RFA on January 29, 2002 to the present.  
On April 1, 2003 Attorney Sturdevant responded by letter stating that "no authority" supported
the taking of the Secretary's deposition.  (Plaintiff's Motion, Exhibit No. 2)  Her position was intractable,
inflexible, and adamantine.  Her tone and statements were oppressive and threatening.
Ms. Sturdevant's threat to retaliate with monetary sanctions for the mere technical notice of this
deposition is an abuse of process.  Her letter threatening sanctions was intended for an improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation in
violation of CCP § 128.7(b).  
Rather than exposing herself and her family to retaliation from the full force and power of the
State by sending a technical notice that would trigger the State's frivolous motion for sanctions, plaintiff
filed her Motion for Protective Order.  Plaintiff's Motion seeks to compel defendants' attorneys to
conduct themselves according to the California Rules of Professional Conduct and Code of Civil
Procedure.  By filing this motion, plaintiff pursuant to 
CCP § 128.7(b) certifies to the Court that to the best of her knowledge, information, and belief, formed
after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, that: 
1.  She is not presenting the motion for an improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.
2.  The legal contentions asserted in the motion are warranted by existing law or by a non-frivolous
argument for the extension of existing law.
3.  The factual contentions have evidentiary support and are likely to have evidentiary 
support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery. 
Plaintiff has already paid a heavy price.  Defendants now seek financial sanctions. Imitating the HMOs
they regulate, defendants are requesting a bonus to wrongfully deny mandated health care benefits.
B. Defendants Meet and Confer with HMOs, Not Patients
       Plaintiff's examination of defendant Department of Managed Health Care's (DMHC) website has
discovered a longstanding practice and pattern to meet and confer with the health plans it regulates,
physician associations, large employers, and other special interests.  The outcome of DMHC's meet and
confer process has been the formation of contracts that undermine the intent of the Knox-Keene Act and
other legal requirements to protect HMO patients.  
DMHC's meet and confer process with health plans began on or about April 5, 2000, prior to the
effective implementation date of the Knox-Keene Act Amendments in 2001.  
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DMHC'S ADVISORY NO.2 REGARDING 1999 LEGISLATION, GENERAL MATTERS: No.
1. MEET AND CONFER  (Exhibit No.1 at p.3) states:
"The Department has offered to meet with plans… regarding the plan's response to the April 5
Letter, either in person or by telephone at the plan's preference, to discuss and resolve the issues of
concern raised in the filing.  The conference is offered to facilitate a swift communication and resolution
of outstanding issues of concern raised in the filing.  Plans are not required to accept the conference in
lieu of written comments, and are requested to advise reviewing counsel if they wish to decline such
conference.  Issues not resolved through the meet and confer process will be reflected in the comment
letter."
Plaintiff's March 18, 2003 letter to Attorney Sturdevant reflects the same conduct and tone as
DMHC's Advisory to health plans and complies with defendants' own meet and confer standards and
process with health plans which reflect cooperation, not the coercion and retaliation found in Attorney
Sturdevant's April 1, 2003 letter to plaintiff. 
The outcome of defendants' meet and confer efforts is a labyrinth of secret, Enronesque, off-the-
books, ex parte contracts between defendants and health plans.
These secret contracts are intended to
and do violate the United States and California Constitutions, California case law, common law and the
legislative intent of the Knox-
Keene Act, rendering plaintiff's and the public's health care benefits illusory.
C. Defendants' Attorneys have Either Lied to Plaintiff and/or Perjured Themselves to the Court
Ms. Sturdevant has made contradictory statements regarding the dates of her performance of
research and the number of hours expended to support her conclusion that no authority supports
Secretary Contreras-Sweet's deposition.  On April 1, 2003, Attorney Sturdevant wrote to plaintiff that no
authority whatsoever supported taking the Secretary's deposition, i.e.:
"No other authority supports your extraordinary request."
Her statement unambiguously implies that she had in fact conducted all necessary and required
research prior to April 1, 2003, the date of her letter.  However, on June 3, 2003, Ms. Sturdevant
(Declaration of Patricia Sturdevant in Support of Defendant's Request for Sanctions Against Plaintiff, p.
2, No. 6) stated:
"As a consequence [emphasis supplied] of plaintiff's filing of her motion for a protective order
and to compel, defendants have incurred and will incur reasonable expenses and attorney's fees in
connection with this motion… a. A total of 15.65 hours researching [emphasis supplied]…"
In her April 1, 2003 letter, Ms. Sturdevant did not inform plaintiff of the authorities pursuant to
the research cited in her June 3, 2003 Declaration to the Court.  If she had not performed the research
prior to April 1, 2003, she lied to plaintiff.  If she had performed the research prior to April 1, 2003, her
declaration's statement that she performed the research "…as a consequence of plaintiff's motion…" is
perjury.  Ms. Sturdevant is requesting sanctions for research that she caused plaintiff to believe had been
performed prior to April 1, 2003, not as a consequence of plaintiff's motion filed on May 1, 2003.
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Absent a hearing, it cannot be determined if Attorney Sturdevant's statements are lies to plaintiff,
perjury to the Court or both.  However, her conduct is clearly disingenuous and undermines the integrity
and trust placed in officers of the court.
"A lawyer may not… [  ]… knowingly make a false statement of material fact to the nonclient…" 
(Rest., 3d, Law Governing Lawyers, § 98, p58.)  "Compliance with those obligations meets social
expectations of honesty and fair dealing and facilitates negotiation and adjudication, which are
important professional functions of lawyers."  (Id., COM. b, p 59, citations omitted.)  (See Wolf v.
Superior Court (2003) Cal.App.4th.)
Defendants' request for sanctions is clearly a fraudulent, frivolous and malicious abuse of the
discovery process intended to chill plaintiff's right to petition.
III. ARGUMENT
A. The Secretary of an Agency has the Authority to Bind the Government to an Implied  
              In Fact Contract.
Plaintiff's verified opposition to defendants' demurrer stated that she relied upon promises and
statements regarding the existence and enforcement of her patient rights in the California Patient's Guide
advertised on the home page of defendant DMHC's website (Opposition to Demurrer, p. 2, lines 9-28).
Defendant DMHC induced plaintiff to submit her Request for Assistance (RFA) and three
Addenda to DMHC in reliance on promises and statements in the California Patient's Guide and in
reliance on specific express instructions for submitting an RFA.  Nurse Consultant Gallagher stated that
she intended to fax Kaiser an order to compel the physician of plaintiff's choice for a second opinion
(per Health & Safety Code § 1383.15(F)) to discuss her rights prior to the establishment of a physician-
patient relationship.  Defendants stated that DMHC made this request to Kaiser, which acceded to it. 
(Answer, p. 2, lines 1-5)
Defendant DMHC and its agents formed contracts with plaintiff and a contract with Kaiser to
which plaintiff is purportedly a 3rd party beneficiary:
1.
The Guide, other statements on DMHC's website, statements, promises,  and conduct by state
officials and DMHC's publications taken together create an implied in fact contract between
the State and plaintiff, when she submitted her RFA, and thereafter.
2.
Nurse Consultant Gallagher's statements, promises, and conduct as an agent of DMHC
created an express oral contract with plaintiff pursuant to her RFA and subsequent
statements.  
3.
Defendants' statements constitute an admission that they made an express contract with
Kaiser Health Plan to perform every promise pursuant to the express oral contract between
Nurse Gallagher and plaintiff for the benefit of plaintiff, the 3rd party beneficiary.
All documents submitted by plaintiff show that defendants breached the aforementioned
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contracts.  Defendants have submitted no contradictory evidence. Secretary Contreras-Sweet's promises,
statements and conduct relating to the existence and enforcement of patient rights 
show that she has personal knowledge of material facts regarding the contracts and the breaches.
B. California Law Guarantees that Plaintiff Has the Right to Take Secretary Contreras-
             Sweet's Deposition
Plaintiff is entitled, as a matter of right, to take the Secretary's deposition to prove her sole cause
of action for breach of contract in violation of her rights under the U.S. and California Constitutions,
California common law, California public policy and the Knox-Keene Act, pursuant to the Court's
February 20, 2003 Ruling.
Plaintiff asserts that defendants' ulterior motive in their abuse of the discovery process is to
prevent her from discovering evidence to prove her cause of action and to test the truth of their
affirmative defenses, among which deny any contract between themselves, their agents and plaintiff
(Answer to Complaint, p. 2, lines 15-20)
On June 2, 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear appeals from veterans who sued to
prove the existence of an implied in fact contract with the government for lifetime health benefits.  The
Court of Appeals had ruled that all promises of benefits were unenforceable solely due to lack of
evidence to prove express authority to bind the government, although that authority may be delegated to
Agency Secretaries.  
The Court of Appeals found that to prove an implied in fact contract with the federal government,
plaintiffs must show (1) mutuality of interest to contract, (2) consideration, 
(3) unambiguous offer and acceptance and (4) that the representative whose conduct is relied on had
actual authority to bind the government.  (Schism v. United States, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, Nov 18, 2002)
Plaintiff contends that defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment will assert that plaintiff has not
and cannot produce evidence of the existence of the implied in fact contract and authority to bind the
state government, given the absence of the government's express intention to do so.  Secretary
Contreras-Sweet can provide the required evidence.  She can certainly testify to the truth and particulars
in her own press releases, promising patient rights enforcement at the direction of Governor Davis and
herself (Motion, Exhibit No.1 at pp. 3-4) upon which plaintiff and the public have relied to their
detriment. 
On March 14, 2001, a California Appeals Court (Stewart v. Colonial Western, 87 Cal.App. 4th
1006, 105 CAL.Rptr.2d115) ruled:
"Unless otherwise limited by order of the court with [the discovery statutes], any party
may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the 
subject
matter involved in the pending action… if the matter either is itself admissible 
in evidence or
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence.  Discovery may
relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery
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of any other party to the action..."  (emphasis added)  (CCP § 2017(a))
"…For discovery purposes, information is relevant if it 'might reasonably assist a party 
in
evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement…' [CITATION
Admissibility is not the test and information, unless privileged, is discoverable if it 
might
reasonably lead to admissible evidence, [CITATION], and contrary to popular 
belief, fishing
expeditions are permissible in some cases."  (Gonzales v. Superior Court  (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539,
1546, quoting Weil and Brown Cal. Practice Guide, Civil 
Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter
Group 1994) Discovery, ¶ 8:66.1, p. 8C-1)
The principal issues in Stewart involved breach of contract in which the existence of an express or
implied in fact contract must be established.  The Appeals Court ruled that the plaintiff was "entitled to
test the truth" of Colonial's defenses.
The Appeals Court also ruled that defense counsel's contention that plaintiff's counsel failed to
engage in a good faith effort to meet and confer (per California Discovery Act § 2025(o)) was not
supported by the facts, i.e.:
Rejecting plaintiff's offer to meet and confer, defense counsel "…did not himself suggest a
date or a time at which he would be available and did not indicate any intention to
compromise."  On these facts the court ruled that plaintiff's counsel's "meet and confer
efforts complied with the statute."
The Appeals Court decision cited authorities which reflect the facts similar to plaintiff's
motion and upon which plaintiff relies, i.e.: McElhaney v. Cessna Aircraft Co. (1982) 134
Cal.App.3d. 285, 289, Townsend v. Superior Court (`1988) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1435, and
Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 431.
C. Defendants' Meet and Confer Process Produced Illegal Contracts with Health Plans to 
  
    Violate Patient Rights and Protections, Including Plaintiff's Right to a Second Opinion.
On or about April 5, 2000, defendants commenced a "meet and confer" advisory process with
health plans (Exhibit No.1 at p.3).  Legislation pertaining to the substantive and procedural requirements
to comply with the Knox-Keene Act statutory mandate of a second opinion was a specific "meet and
confer" topic. (Exhibit No.1 at p.1)  Defendants' meet and confer process arguably resulted in secret ex
parte contracts with health plans and other parties to violate and otherwise render illusory plaintiff's
right to a second opinion in compliance with the Knox-Keene Act, common law rights, and
Constitutional rights.  
Plaintiff is entitled to discovery pursuant to California Civil Code § 1668
which states:
"All contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone from
responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another, or violation of
law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law."
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Tunkl v. Regents of University of California, 60 Cal.2d 92, (July 9, 1963) stated criteria to assess
the relationship of public policy to the particulars of contracts such as plaintiff's contracts with
defendants, i.e.:
"It concerns a business of a type generally thought suitable for public regulation."
"The party seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a service of great importance to the
public, which is often a matter of practical necessity for some members of the public…"
"The party holds himself out as willing to perform this service for any member of the public
who seeks it or at least any member coming within established standards…"
"As a result of the essential nature of the service in the economic setting of the transaction,
the party invoking exculpation possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against
any member of the public who seeks his services…"
"Since the service is one which each member of the public, presently or 
potentially, may find essential to him, he faces, despite his economic inability to 
do
so, the prospect of a compulsory assumption of the risk of another's 
negligence…"
"The public policy of this state has been, in substance, to posit the risk of negligence upon
the actor; in circumstances in which this policy has been abandoned, it has generally been to
allow or require that the risk shift to another party better or equally able to bear it, not to shift
the risk to the weaker bargainer…"
Defendants did not acknowledge or disclose their purported contract with Kaiser, to which
plaintiff was a third party beneficiary, until after plaintiff filed suit.  Prior to filing suit in October, 2002,
defendants had closed plaintiff's case in April, 2002, six months earlier.  The evidence, i.e., plaintiff's
documentary exhibits to her Petition, shows that "the decision maker attempted to hide… the illegal
reason for their decision with a false explanation, and that in this they acted in a manner that was base,
contemptible or vile."  (Cloud v. Casey, 76 Cal.App. 4th 895).  Their oppression was expressed in
despicable conduct that subjected plaintiff to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of her
rights in violation of California Civil Code § 3294 (c)(2).
D. This Court Has Ruled That Plaintiff's Allegations of Gagging and Retaliation In 
  
     Violation of Public Policy that Render Her Contract Benefits Illusory Are 
  
     Incorporated In Her Cause of Action.
Defendants' sole reliance on statutory and regulatory authority, ignoring the primacy of the common law
and the U.S. and California Constitutions, violates plaintiff's rights.  Defendants wrote the Knox-Keene
Act regulations themselves and duplicitously claim the discretion to interpret them without disclosure of
their decision making substance and procedures.  Federal and California Courts disagree with
defendants.  No statute or regulation supplants the common law and the U.S. and California
Constitutions, i.e.: 
"A statute valid on its face will be declared unconstitutional if it is unconstitutionally applied by a
public officer or agency empowered to effectuate it."  (Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886) 118 U.S. 356, 373-
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374 [30 L. Ed. 220, 227-228, 6 S.Ct 1064]; People v Wingo (1975) 14 Cal.3d. 169, 180-181 [121
Cal.Rptr. 97, 534 P.2d 1001].[9b]  
The Federal 9th Circuit recently quoted an August 23, 1999 opinion by the California Supreme
Court (Indian Gaming v. State of California, No. 01-16283, D.C. No. CV-98-01806-CW, June 11,
2003):
"…in a conflict between statutory and constitutional law, the Constitution must 
prevail…"
The 9th Circuit's opinion in Conant (Plaintiff's Petition Memorandum p. 5, lines 21-25) ruled that
the state may not act to violate the patient's common law right to informed consent in the physician-
patient relationship: i.e.,
"The government's policy does, however, strike at core First Amendment interests of doctors and
patients.  An integral component of the practice of medicine is the 
communication between a
doctor and a patient.  That need has been recognized by the 
courts through the application of the
common law doctor-patient privilege."  (See 
Federal Rules of Evidence)
In plaintiff's case, defendants and Kaiser Health Plan have conspired to violate constitutionally protected
free speech and to parse "medical opinion" from the entire communication process through which the
medical opinion is formed, validated, and accepted. (Defendants' Opposition to Motion, p.1, lines 27-28,
p.2, lines 1-2)
The California Supreme Court (City of Moorpark v. Moorpark School District (1991) 54, Cal.3d.
921, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 896, 819 P.2d. 854) ruled that the common law of contracts applies to transactions
pursuant to statutes, stating that "statutes generally do not supplant the common law unless it appears
that the Legislature intended to occupy the field.  (I.E.
Associates v. Safeco (1985) 39 Cal.3d. 281, 285 [216 Cal.Rptr. 438, 702 P.2d 596.] (1b)
E. HMO Patients Are Entitled to the Same Health Care Rights and Protections as 
   
   
Prisoners
Defendants' citation of Deukmejian v. Superior Court (1983), has backfired.  That case supports
plaintiff's contentions that, like the Department Corrections, defendant DMHC does not have the
authority to violate the patient's right to informed consent.
In 1993, the California Supreme Court ordered the California Department of Corrections to
enforce, not violate, a prisoner's common law right to informed consent and prohibited coercion and
retaliation to compel the prisoner to accept medical treatment and care against his consent.  (Thor v.
Superior Ct. (1993) 5 Cal.4th. 725, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 357; 855 P. 2d 375 [No. SO26393, July 26, 1993])
The conclusion in the Thor Court's opinion is even more relevant today to prevent abuse of
power, i.e., the oppressive promulgation and malicious interpretation of regulations by the State in
conspiracy with the HMOs it regulates to dominate the individual and violate his or her rights, i.e.: 
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"We confront here the development and evolution of medical-legal relationships, which call for
the setting of bounds reflecting the wisdom and spirit of our times.  The balance of rights and
responsibilities must not endanger the dignity of the law or of human beings.  In considering the lessons
of history and progress, our duty is inevitable and in accord with the enlightenment of modern
circumstances."
In Thor, a prisoner was granted his absolute right per the common law Doctrine of Informed
consent to terminate his own life by refusing to consent to medical treatment imposed by the California
Department of Corrections. 
In the instant case, defendants' refusal to recognize that they have a legal duty to implement
plaintiff's rights in their regulation of health plans renders her contractual health care benefits illusory,
harming her own and the public's health and safety.  Unlike Mr. Thor, plaintiff chooses to live as free of
disease and disability as possible for as long as possible and to make informed decisions to implement
her values.
California Public Policy supports plaintiff's and the public's rights to these values, a need that
caused the Legislature and Governor Davis to create defendant DMHC and employ defendants Zingale
and George.  Defendants' mandate is to enforce, not violate, California Public Policy that was
specifically intended to protect the health and safety of all Californians. 
The common law Doctrine of Informed Consent, as stated in defendants' own Guide is part of an
implied in fact contract between HMO patients and defendants expressly intended by the Legislature. 
All agencies of state government, including DMHC and Department of Corrections have the same legal
duty to enforce, not violate patient rights. 
Plaintiff has the right to depose Secretary Contreras-Sweet.  Her press release statements,
promises and conduct are fraudulent and materially contribute to defendants' breaches of contracts with
plaintiff and the public, as does the Guide.  In their Demurrer and Answer, Defendants expressly
disavow all contractual promises of patient rights existence and statutory duty to enforce patient rights.   
F. Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order, Order to Compel and Sanctions Is Justified  
             Pursuant to This Court's Ruling
Defendants have attempted to parse the Court's February 20, 2003 Ruling that (in its entirety) is
consistent with the California Supreme Court's opinion in Thor and the 9th Circuit's opinion in Conant
Defendants have ignored this Court's express identification of allegations pertaining to gagging,
coercion, retaliation and violation of public policy.  Defendants' contention that a physician-patient
relationship can be and must be established, absent informed consent and other rights, is antithetical to
statements in DMHC's own Guide and Governor Davis' express promises.  
This Court, as does the California Supreme Court and the Federal 9th Circuit, finds that these
factors are integral to and inseparable from the statutory mandate for a second opinion from the
specialist of plaintiff's choice.  In the absence of informed consent, the Knox-Keene Act in its entirety is
rendered absurd. This Court, as does the California Supreme Court and the 9th Circuit, finds that
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plaintiff's allegations, if true, prove that defendants' conduct is repugnant to and irreparably harms the
public's trust, health and safety.
As Justice Arabian wrote in Thor regarding the State's argument:
"This argument misapprehends the intensely personal nature and broadly based scope of the right
to personal autonomy, which simply will not accommodate the kind of parsing [emphasis supplied]
petitioner invites.  For self-determination to have any meaning, it cannot be subject to the scrutiny of
anyone else's conscience or sensibilities.  It is the individual who must live or die with the course of
treatment chosen or rejected, not the state..."  [emphasis supplied]
IV. Conclusion
The facts show that Governor Davis is orchestrating a cover-up of defendants' breaches of
contracts, while continuing to direct Secretary Contreras-Sweet and defendants to represent to the public
that they are enforcing the contracts.  Defendant Zingale is now Governor Davis' Deputy Chief of Staff
and Cabinet Secretary and continues to present the governor's disingenuous positions on health care to
the press and the public. (Exhibit No. 2)  Absent a Protective Order and Order to Compel, Defendants'
attorneys will also contend that no authority supports the taking of defendant Zingale's deposition. 
Plaintiff must be protected from Governor Davis' retaliation, using the full force and power of the
government against plaintiff for exercising her right to petition.  Governor Davis has expressed threats
against other "enemies" in retaliation for exercising their right to petition.  He stated to the Los Angeles
Times correspondent George Skelton:
"They can take a shot.  Then they'll get their ass kicked.  Folks have been 
underestimating me
for a long time… don't worry about it, man.  I'm not going to lose 
this one."  (Los Angeles
Times, June 12, 2003, p. B8)
Plaintiff, already disabled by progressive post polio, has felt and continues to feel the fear of
pursuing her lawsuit to obtain the health care contract benefits and protections to which she has a right. 
Defendants' conduct in this lawsuit is a manifestation of Governor Davis' vindictive mindset to use the
superior power of the State and its army of attorneys to violate plaintiff's rights and protections,
rendering her contract benefits illusory.
Respectfully submitted, 
_______________________                     _____________
Jacquelyn Finney
Date
In Pro Per
VERIFICATION
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and
correct, and that this declaration was executed on June 23, 2003 in Encinitas, California.
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Reply to Opposition Motion for Protective Order, Order to Compel Testimony, Sanctions
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               Jacquelyn Finney______________
________________________
                     Declarant
  Signature