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JACQUELYN FINNEY
Encinitas, CA 
Pro Se
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
JACQUELYN FINNEY,
                               Plaintiff,
v.
THOMAS P. NUGENT, Judge of the San Diego
Superior Court, an individual in his official
capacity; JOAN P. WEBER, Supervising Judge
of the San Diego Superior Court (The North
County Regional Center) an individual in her
official capacity; RICHARD E. L. STRAUSS,
Presiding Judge of the San Diego Superior
Court, an individual in his official capacity;
THE SAN DIEGO COUNTY SUPERIOR
COURT, a public entity; JUDITH
MCCONNELL, Presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals, 4th
Dist. Div. One, an individual in her
official capacity; THE COURT OF APPEALS,
4th DIST. DIV. ONE, a public entity; WILLIAM
C. VICKREY, Administrative Director of the
Courts, an individual in his official capacity;
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
COURTS, a public entity; THE JUDICIAL
COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, a public entity
and DOES 1-25, inclusive, individual defendants
are sued in their official capacities.
                                 Defendants.
   
Civil Case No. 2004 CV 0148 L(POR)
COMPLAINT FOR PRELIMINARY &
PERMANENT INJUNCTIVE RELIEF,
DECLARATORY RELIEF, AND
DAMAGES
1.
Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. § 12131 
      et seq.)
2.
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq.)
3.
Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
4.
Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1985)
5.
Article I, Section 7(a) of the
California Constitution
6.
Article I, Section 3 of the California
Constitution
7.
California Government Code
§ 11135
Jury Trial Demanded
A REPRESENTATIVE COPY OF THE FILING
FILED
2004 JAN23   AM 10:47
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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INTRODUCTION
1.
This constitutional and civil rights complaint is filed by Jacquelyn Finney, a former
federal fraud, waste, abuse and mismanagement investigator, who monitored states'
compliance with federal anti-discrimination/equal opportunity laws as part of her
duties.  Plaintiff is now totally disabled due to polio, intractable pain and osteoporosis. 
2.
This case arises due to a stratagem of state laws, rules, policies, practices and conduct
that allow deliberate indifference to and discriminatory animus against disabled
persons by individual judges, courts, court administrators and judicial governance/
administrative entities to deny plaintiff the free exercise of her Constitutional rights to
petition and to access state courts by:
a.
exploiting her disabilities, 
b.
by risking her health and safety, 
c.
by eroding her will and physical stamina to oppose illegal conduct.
Such discrimination will inevitably cause the dismissal of plaintiff's state lawsuit, 
filed on October 11, 2002 in the San Diego Superior Court.  This case is of
extraordinary public interest.
3.
Plaintiff's state lawsuit opposes the California Department of Managed Health Care's
(DMHC) enforcement of an HMO subscriber contract condition that requires
unconscionable prior restraint on her speech in the context of her doctor-patient
relationships in order to obtain state mandated and contractual medical benefits. 
Plaintiff has been denied access to specialist physician medical care for three (3) years
by Kaiser Foundation Health Plan (Kaiser) due to her extraordinary firmness in
refusing to waive her First Amendment rights.  Plaintiff's HMO contract benefits have
been rendered illusory, unjustly enriching her HMO.  This case is of extraordinary
public interest. 
4.
Plaintiff challenges defendants':
a.
Refusal to accommodate her disability. 
b.
Refusal to investigate her complaints of discrimination, coercion and
retaliation.
c.
Violation and conspiracy to violate her U.S./California Constitutional and civil
rights. 
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d.   Imposition of procedural barriers and fees upon disabled persons 
e.
Promulgation of discriminatory laws, rules, policies, procedures and practices  
that prevent disqualification of judges biased against disabled persons.
f.
Retaliation against disabled persons who file discrimination complaints
regarding biased judges.
g.
Violation of state laws, local court rules, policies and directives against
disability discrimination and bias.
h.
Enactment of California Rule of Court 989.3 to intentionally violate the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),      
i.
Allowing DMHC attorneys to exploit her disability in order to wrongly dismiss
her underlying state Constitutional litigation. 
j.
Constitutional "CHINA SYNDROME" stratagem that has caused the rapid and
disastrous decline and collapse of fundamental federal and state Constitutional
rights of disabled persons. 
5.
Plaintiff has suffered discrimination, coercion, retaliation, physical pain and
humiliation intentionally inflicted by state court judges and court public entities under
circumstances that are equal to and exponentially exceed injuries suffered by
respondents in Tennessee v. Lane, argued before the U.S. Supreme Court on January
13, 2004. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
6.
This action arises under the Constitution and law of the United States, including Title
II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et. seq. ("ADA"), § 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, U.S.C. § 794 et seq. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42
U.S.C. § 1985 and the Constitution and the law of the State of California.  Jurisdiction
is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 and 1367 and pursuant to its
supplemental jurisdiction over claims brought under the laws of the State of
California. 
7.
The Court may grant declaratory relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C §§ 2201 and 2202 and
grant injunctive relief pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") Rule 65.
8.
Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
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PARTIES
9.
Plaintiff Jacquelyn Finney is and was at all times material hereto a resident of
Encinitas, California.
10. Plaintiff's unwavering commitment to the traditional relationship of trust and 
communication in the physician-patient relationship (as supported by the U.S. and
California Constitutions, the Common Law Doctrine of Informed Consent, and
California Public Policy) is a core personal value, recognized by the U.S. Supreme
Court and the California Supreme Court as a right fundamental to prisoners. 
11. Each day plaintiff is conscious that the traditional relationship of trust and 
communication between her doctors and herself (from the time she was diagnosed
with and paralyzed by polio 50 years ago at age 6 and throughout 11 years of constant
corrective surgery and physical therapy) enabled her to walk again at age 17.
12. If plaintiff had been stricken with paralytic polio as a managed care patient under the 
coercion and duress caused by DMHC approved unconscionable contracts of adhesion
between HMOs and subscribers that have rendered her benefits illusory, she would not
experience the joy in the simple act of putting one foot in front of the other to obtain
ineluctable justice for herself and the large class of disabled persons whom she
represents. 
a.
The California Knox-Keene Act (KKA) mandates that DMHC license health 
care service plans.
b.
Under the KKA, DMHC requires health plans to submit their contracts of
adhesion with subscribers for review and approval to determine compliance
with the Act, as being "fair, reasonable and consistent with the objectives" of
that statute. 
c.
DMHC has approved Kaiser Foundation Health Plan's unconscionable contract 
of adhesion that compels plaintiff to agree to prior restraint on her speech in
the context of her doctor-patient relationships as a precondition to obtain
medical benefits, in violation of Health & Safety Code, § 1367(h).  
13. Mrs. Finney has physical impairments that substantially limit several major life
activities.  She has a record of physical impairments that substantially limit several
major life activities.  Mrs. Finney's disability is within the meaning of the ADA and
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the Rehabilitation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2)(A); 29 U.S.C. § 794; 49 C.F.R. § 37.3;
28 C.F.R. § 35.104.  She is also a "handicapped person" within the meaning of 49
C.F.R. § 27.5.
14. In addition, Mrs. Finney has a physiological disease, disorder or condition that affects
her neurological, musculoskeletal, and/or special sense organs that limits major life
activities.  Mrs. Finney is a person with a disability as defined in applicable California
law, including California Government Code § 11135.
15. Defendant Thomas P. Nugent is a judge of the San Diego Superior Court.  He is
responsible for nonjudicial administrative acts to approve and deny Requests for
Accommodations by Disabled Persons pursuant to California Rule of Court 989.3, to
assure compliance with the ADA.  He is also responsible for implementing Local
Court Policy Against Bias.  He is sued in his official capacity. 
16. Defendant Joan P. Weber is Supervising Judge of the San Diego Superior Court.  She
is responsible for the supervision, operation and administration of services, programs
and activities of the San Diego Superior Court, The North County Regional Center,
including the administration of California Rule of Court 989.3 and Local Court Policy
Against Bias.  She is sued in her official capacity.
17. Defendant Richard E. L. Strauss is Presiding Judge of the San Diego Superior Court. 
He is responsible for the promulgation of local policies and Rules of Court and the
supervision, operation and administration for all the San Diego Superior Court
services, programs and activities, including Rule of Court 989.3.  Defendant Strauss is
also a voting member of The Judicial Council of California, which promulgates
policies and rules prohibiting discrimination and bias toward disabled persons by
judges, court staff and attorneys.  He is sued in his official capacity.
18. Defendant San Diego Superior Court is a public entity funded by the State of
California to adjudicate legal disputes in San Diego County, before which disabled
litigants and attorneys appear.  This Court is a public entity covered by Title II of the
ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1).
19. Judith McConnell is Presiding Justice of the California Court of Appeals, Fourth
District, Division One.  She is responsible for the promulgation of Court policies and
rules and supervision, operation and administration of all Appeals Court services,
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programs and activities, including accommodation of disabled persons pursuant to
California Rule of Court 989.3.  She chairs the Judicial Council's Judicial Branch
Budget Advisory Committee, which provides budgetary advice to California Courts
regarding compliance with legal mandates of ADA.  She is sued in her official
capacity.
20. Defendant California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, Division One, is a public
entity funded by the State of California to adjudicate writs and appeals from litigants
in the San Diego Superior Court.  This Court is a public entity covered by Title II of
the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1).
21. Defendant William C. Vickrey is the Director of the Administrative Office of the
Courts.  He is responsible for the promulgation of Judicial Council court policies and
rules and the supervision, operation and administration of all California court services,
programs and activities, including providing accommodations to disabled persons
pursuant to California Rule of Court 989.3 and the ADA.  He is sued in his official
capacity. 
22. Defendant, The Judicial Council of California ("Council"), is a public entity funded by
the State of California to set policy and make rules for all courts, including policies
and rules prohibiting bias and discrimination against disabled persons and for
providing accommodations to disabled persons to access court services, programs and
activities pursuant to California Rule of Court 989.3.  The Council is a public entity
covered by Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1).
23. Defendant Administrative Office of the Courts ("AOC") is a public entity funded by
the State of California to administer all activities of the Council, including policies and
rules prohibiting bias and discrimination against disabled persons and for providing
accommodations to disabled persons to access court services, programs and activities
pursuant to California Rule of Court 989.3.  AOC is a public entity covered by Title II
of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1).
24. Unknown defendants DOES 1-25 are persons and public entities employed/funded by
the State of California who are responsible for the promulgation and implementation
of policies and rules prohibiting bias and discrimination against disabled persons and
for providing accommodations to disabled persons to access court services, programs
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and activities pursuant to California Rule of Court 989.3 and the ADA.  They are sued
in their official capacities and/or as public entities covered by Title II of the ADA, 42
U.S.C. § 12131(1). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS
25. The facts arising from plaintiff's pursuit of her underlying state lawsuit caused her to 
question and submit timely complaints regarding defendant Nugent's deliberate 
indifference to her Constitutional and ADA rights.
26. When state judges discriminate against plaintiff, as a disabled litigant in violation of 
her ADA rights, these judges also violate plaintiff's Constitutional rights to access and
to petition the courts and to exercise her U.S. and California Constitutional right to
speak to her doctors without unconscionable prior restraint on speech as a
precondition to obtain state mandated and contract health care benefits (plaintiff's
underlying state cause of action). 
27. On August 4, 2003, plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration of defendant Nugent's 
July 24, 2003 ruling on her Motion for a Protective Order, including but not limited to
the Court’s ignoring her polio disability and failure to compel accommodation of
plaintiff’s polio disability by DMHC attorneys.
a.
By ignoring DMHC's exploitation of plaintiff’s polio disability, which in and
of itself merits a strong protective order, defendant Nugent enabled DMHC to
improperly harass and to otherwise put plaintiff at a grievous disadvantage in
the expeditious pursuit of her case.  Indeed, DMHC's malicious and frivolous
conduct (including but not limited to denial of virtually indisputable matters
such as matters of public record, i.e., their own patient rights Guide) have
severely exacerbated plaintiff’s intractable pain and other symptoms, and have
distressed plaintiff's husband, her sole caregiver. 
 
b.
Defendant Nugent's July 24, 2003 Ruling that plaintiff’s Motion for a
Protective Order “fails to identify the precise nature of the protective order”
pertaining to the accommodation of plaintiff’s polio disability is the equivalent
of a “Get Out of Jail Free” card in defendants’ monopoly game with the life
and death of vulnerable patients in conspiracy with Kaiser and all health plans
to minimize State budget expenditures and maximize HMO profits.  
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c.
Defendant Nugent's July 24, 2003 Ruling improperly focused on form over
substance and denied plaintiff’s requests for accommodation and protection,
that are supported by undisputed evidence, facts and legal authorities, on
grounds of immaterial technicalities which could have been easily cured had
the Court entertained oral argument as requested by plaintiff.
d.
Defendant Nugent's ruling that plaintiff’s motion failed to identify the
"precise" (emphasis supplied) nature of the protective order sought ignored the
precision of “Proposed Particulars of the Order” as stated in Plaintiff’s
Motion’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities. 
e.
Defendant Nugent's ruling ignored plaintiff’s substantial justification and other
circumstances in filing her motion and improperly awarded $1,119.00 in
sanctions to DMHC, ignoring plaintiff’s undisputed evidence that the
attorneys' fees are bogus and are unjustified and the declarations on which they
are based are false.  
f.
Defendant Nugent's chilling of plaintiff’s rights to access and petition by his
failure to cite his standards and criteria in awarding sanctions (on the grounds
that plaintiff did not act with substantial justification or other circumstances that
did not make the imposition of sanctions unjust at present and in the future
regarding accommodation of her disability) subjected plaintiff to unconscionable
coercion and retaliation by the Court and defendants for exercising her right to
be free from discrimination. 
g.
Defendant Nugent refused to be bound by controlling federal and state legal
authorities, including but not limited to Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629 (9th
Cir. 2002), and Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services 6 P.3d
669, 24 Cal.4th
83 (2000). He has demonstrated deliberate indifference to and
discriminatory animus toward plaintiff.  
28. On August 4, 2003, plaintiff filed a confidential complaint and request for
investigation of bias, due to her disability, by defendant Nugent with Presiding Judge
Richard E. L. Strauss (pursuant to local court rules), through Supervising Judge Joan
P. Weber.
29.  On August 11, 2003, Defendant Weber responded to plaintiff's letter, not Judge 
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Strauss, wrongly stating that “I… do not find that Judge Nugent ignored your request
[for defendants’ accommodation of her polio disability] or otherwise acted
improperly…”  Defendant Weber violated California Rule of Court 989.3(c)(4),
breaching confidentiality by sending DMHC's attorney her response to plaintiff's bias
complaint.  Defendant Weber has demonstrated deliberate indifference and
discriminatory animus toward plaintiff.
30. On August 15, 2003 plaintiff requested in writing that defendant Strauss respond 
personally to her August 4, 2003 complaint in that defendant Weber breached
confidentiality and mischaracterized, failed to address, and failed to properly address her
concerns.  
31. One month later, on September 18, 2003, defendant Strauss replied by letter, stating:
“… I have not reviewed the file… although I am the Presiding Judge of this Court, 
my duties are limited to those set forth in California Rules of the Court at
rule 6.603… A presiding judge does not have any oversight [emphasis supplied]
… over the other judges." 
Defendant Strauss' statement, if true, constituted an admission that defendant Weber, as
the Supervising Judge, violated California Rules of Court by reviewing "the file" and
ruling that defendant Nugent had not acted "improperly" in any way. 
32. Presiding Judge Strauss violated his own local court rules in that he refused to accept 
and/or refer a complaint of bias against a judicial colleague for investigation, in
violation of ADA Title II.  Defendants Strauss and San Diego Superior Court have
shown deliberate indifference to plaintiff's complaints of discrimination.
33. On October 9, 2003 defendant Nugent ruled on plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration. 
His ruling stated that the facts upon which he had found a breach of contract cause of
action (i.e., "gagging", "coercion", "retaliation") on February 20, 2003 in his prior
ruling on demurrer were now "extraneous" and that plaintiff had "misinterpreted…the
court's clearly stated …ruling."  He did not cite any legal authority.  He had not made
this statement in his July 24, 2003 ruling on plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order. 
34. Moreover, defendant Nugent's October 9, 2003 ruling stated that he had neither 
ignored nor improperly refused plaintiff's request for accommodation of her polio
disability by DMHC lawyers, in that she had not made the request in her notice of
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motion.  In addition, he found that she had made the request on page 15 of her
memorandum of points and authorities, she had not cited an authority at the time in
support of her request, and she "… has failed to state the precise request for
accommodation… Notwithstanding, the court declines to find that this language
supports the imposition of any order against defendants."
35. On October 31, 2003, plaintiff followed defendant Weber’s instruction to submit the
Judicial Council Form to Request Disability Accommodation to defendant Nugent, i.e.,
“I have enclosed for your convenience a form adopted by The Judicial Council of
California entitled ‘Request for Accommodations by Persons with Disabilities and
Order.’  I encourage you to use this form and file it with the court if in the future you
seek any accommodations.”  
36. On November 4, 2003, defendant Nugent denied plaintiff’s request for
accommodation “without prejudice,” by checking a box on the form and adding
handwritten comments, respectively stating that i.e.:
a.
“The applicant does not satisfy the requirements of the rule…”  (box checked)
b.
“Failure to Specify Accommodation Required!”  (handwritten comment
including exclamation point)
37. California Rule 989.3 states that the applicant must "describe," not "specify" the
accommodation requested.  However, the Request Form provides less than one (1")
inch of space to "specify" type of accommodation, special requests and anticipated
problems.
38. Defendant Nugent's denial of plaintiff's request, due to failure to comply with 
Rule 989.3 requirement of specificity, is a "Catch-22."  The form's construction
precludes specificity, providing a pretext for repeated wrongful denials and/or the
threat of denial of future ADA accommodation requests with prejudice and imposition
of monetary sanctions.  Defendant Nugent had imposed $1119.00 in sanctions on
plaintiff for requesting a protective order regarding remedy of DMHC's refusal to
accommodate her disability.  Defendant Nugent's animus is apparent from his
intentional inclusion of an exclamation point to emphasize his absolute authority to
deny plaintiff's future requests with prejudice.
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39. Denial of reasonable accommodation with or without prejudice is not permitted by the
Form itself, in Rule of Court 989.3, in any guidance to the public regarding Rule of
Court 989.3, in the Americans with Disabilities Act, Title II, or in any guidance to the
public regarding ADA Title II.
40. The sole remedy for wrongful denial of accommodation, provided by California Rule 
of Court 989.3, is a writ petition to the Appeals Court within a ten (10) day period,
which In Pro Per disabled applicants are unable to do on a one-time basis, much less
on a continuous basis.  Moreover, the Appeals Court, to which plaintiff must apply,
did not offer accommodations pursuant to ADA/Rule 989.3 on its website, until
January 5, 2004, pursuant to plaintiff's suggestion.  
41. Each time a Superior Court judge denies a request for accommodation, the 
disabled litigant must pay a $655.00 filing fee, i.e., a "court tax" which is analogous  
to a "poll tax."  
a.
Plaintiff finds no California case law in which a judge or a court has been
required to pay plaintiff's fees, when the decision has been reversed by a Writ
Petition to an Appeals Court. 
b.
If allowed to continue, defendants' repetitive discrimination that evades
review will result in unjust enrichment and in the formation of a profit center
in the Appeals Court budget.  The ADA prohibits the court's financial charges
for accommodations required the under the Act.  
c.
It is unconscionable and illegal that Rule 989.3 requires writ review within ten
(10) days for denial of plaintiff's ADA requests by defendants.  The burden is
on defendants to prove that they cannot reasonably accommodate requests.
42. The Americans with Disabilities Act, Title II prohibits denial of a Request for 
Accommodations on the pretext that "the applicant does not satisfy the requirements
of the Rule."  Rule 989.3 provides a procedure to permit judges' denials of requests for
accommodation by every disabled litigant, attorney, juror, and citizen in California
pursuant to an illegal pretext.
a.
Rule 989.3 states that the applicant must “describe,” not “specify.”  The
Judicial Council’s Form MC-410 conflicts with Rule of Court 989.3.  An
applicant's description of accommodation does not need to meet an individual
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judge's undisclosed criteria to comply with "specification" requirements that
are not permitted under Rule 989.3 and ADA. 
b.
The ADA does not require disabled persons to be mind readers and to conform
to procedures that are inconsistent with and otherwise violate state law, which
in turn violates the ADA with which Rule 989.3 expressly purports to have
been enacted to implement full and complete compliance.
c.
Rule 989.3 provides for no other formal procedure to request accommodation
in addition to Form MC-410, which may only be submitted to judges.  Rule
989.3 does not provide disabled litigants oral and written formal procedures to
request accommodations from court staff for modification of services, such as
standing in long lines to file papers at the clerk's counter, which plaintiff has
experienced and witnessed at defendant San Diego Superior Court.  
d.
Rule 989.3 and Form MC-410 are a scheme, designed and intended to facilitate
and to evade compliance and review, not to eradicate discrimination.  The Rule
of Court and the Form were enacted as an illegal stratagem by defendants
Judicial Council of California and Administrative Office of the Courts and
implemented by defendant Vickrey, Director, Administrative Office of the
Courts. 
e.
Judges enjoy absolute immunity for all judicial acts.  By directing all requests
for accommodation under Rule 989.3 to judges, judges and court entities are
able to avoid scrutiny and liability for discriminatory acts.  However, Rule of
Court 989.3 is an administrative act that permits ex parte communication that
does "not deal in any manner with the subject matter or the merits of the
proceedings before the court" (Rule 989.3(d)). Additionally, administrative
actions pursuant to the ADA do not provide judges/courts such immunity.  
f.
Judges do not enjoy immunity for performing acts and other conduct that
coerce, threaten and retaliate against litigants who exercise their Constitutional
and civil rights.  Rule 989.3 states:
"The Council has adopted this rule to help implement the Americans with
Disabilities Act, which requires public entities, including the courts
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[emphasis supplied] to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices
and procedures to avoid discrimination against persons with disabilities..." 
In reality, the true purpose of Rule 989.3 is the creation of a fraudulent scheme
to violate ADA by the California courts and California judges. 
g.
Rule 989.3 makes no express provision for submitting requests to the Appeals
Courts or to the Supreme Court.  Requiring disabled litigants to submit a writ
petition to the California Supreme Court to review denial of a request(s) for
accommodation by Appeals Courts within ten (10) days renders the Rule
absurd and otherwise defeats the express purpose of the Rule.
43. On November 22, 2003, plaintiff filed a complaint with David Yamasaki, Assistant 
Executive Officer, San Diego Superior Court (The North County Regional Center) and
defendant Vickrey, Administrative Director of the Courts, regarding violation of the 
ADA by defendants Nugent, Weber and Strauss, in addition to administrative
malfeasance and possible misuse of funds.  
a.
Plaintiff reported “Undisclosed and Inconsistent Court Information… that 
violate the letter and spirit of the ADA, indicating a policy and practice to
 
intentionally violate disabled persons’ right to petition the court.”  
b.
Plaintiff reported “Procedural Barriers…  The ADA Coordinator is not disclosed
on the Court’s website, although the position and employee is identified on the
Court’s intranet, which is not accessible to the public even through the County
law library.” 
c.
Plaintiff reported “Violations of ADA, Title II… Full disclosure of all court
services and programs should be displayed with suggested accommodations. 
The ADA prohibits secret criteria and other barriers that restrict access to
reasonable access by disabled persons…”
d.
Plaintiff stated that “…the Court’s indifference, lack of initiative and failure to
be proactive and sensitive in implementing ADA and other requirements,
adversely affect disabled citizens’ ability to exercise their rights, in plaintiff's
case to petition the Court to enforce her Constitutions rights.”  
e.
Plaintiff stated that “…concerted coercion and retaliation that would chill the
exercise of rights by persons of ordinary firmness have been personally directed
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toward her by three judges and Ms. Ohanneson (the court reporter).”  Plaintiff
reported a “Finding of Futility” in that “… especially disconcerting is the
Presiding Judge’s refusal and express denial of his legal duty to accept and
investigate or to cause  appropriate authorities to accept and investigate
complaints of bias and prejudice submitted to him by disabled persons, regarding
judges’ misconduct.”  
(1) Plaintiff reported “Administrative Malfeasance… Judge Strauss’ actions are
inconsistent with Judicial Council policies on access and fairness.” 
(2)  No judges, much less judges with defendants' Nugent’s, Weber’s and
Strauss’ experience and intelligence, would reasonably believe that in
proceeding in this way that they were affording plaintiff the meaningful
exercise of her rights (absent coercion and retaliation) that she is entitled to
under the U.S. and California Constitutions, the ADA and California laws.
Defendants ignored and failed to enforce plaintiff's rights by interpreting the law and
implementing court rules and procedures in a manner that intentionally frustrates their
purpose.  The California Supreme Court ruled on December 1, 2003  in Schifando v.
City of Los Angeles (§ 10660) that:
“…we have never confronted the issue here presented, and find troubling the
possibility that exhausting City Charter procedures might deprive a victim of
discrimination of a civil right created by the Legislature…”
44. On November 24, 2003, (the same day that plaintiff's complaint was received by Mr.
Yamasaki, the Court’s Assistant Executive Officer), defendant Nugent scheduled the
Initial Case Management Conference for December 19, 2003.  He scheduled the
Conference one year subsequent to plaintiff's filing her Petition for Writ of Mandate to
compel DMHC to cease and desist in condoning prior restraint on her speech to obtain a
state mandated medical benefit. 
45. Defendant Nugent’s conduct provides further evidence of retaliation against plaintiff for    
exercising her rights under the ADA, California Rule of Court 989.3 and San Diego
County Superior Court Rules to file complaints of bias, prejudice and judicial
misconduct.  Defendant Nugent had refused plaintiff's multiple requests for in-person
hearings prior to his July 24, 2003 and October 9, 2003 Rulings at which time she could
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have tested the truth of defendants statements and could have tested his findings of fact
and legal conclusions.
46.
Based on the totality of defendant Nugent’s conduct, it is fair and consistent to believe 
that he intended to use the December 19, 2003 “Conference” to continue his illegal
pattern of conduct to further violate plaintiff's rights that would immediately or
eventually result in the dismissal of her state litigation with prejudice.
47. On December 3, 2003, plaintiff submitted her Peremptory Challenge to disqualify 
defendant Nugent to defendant Nugent.  On December 5, 2003, defendant Nugent
denied plaintiff’s challenge.  Pursuant to San Diego Superior Court Local Rules,
Division II, Rule 5.5, plaintiff was required to use form “SDSC CIV-249 (Rev. 5-00)
to file her peremptory challenge, which she did.
48. On December 5, 2003, by telephone, plaintiff met and conferred with DMHC Counsel 
Patricia Sturdevant pursuant to Rule CCP 212 Case Management Meet and Confer 
requirement.  Plaintiff agreed with Ms. Sturdevant's opinion that defendant Nugent's
ruling on plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration on October 9, 2003 rendered
defendant Nugent's prior ruling on demurrer "inexplicable" and that they were "stuck"
while the case was "languishing."  Plaintiff informed her of the peremptory challenge
that was intended, in part, to provide a remedy. 
49. C.C.P. § 170.6(3) states that:
“…if the motion is duly presented and the affidavit or declaration… is duly filed…
thereupon and without any further act or proof…” a judge should refer the case for
reassignment.
50. Although defendant Nugent denied plaintiff’s challenge, the local court’s form does 
not expressly provide a section in which the judge must state his reason(s) for denial. 
Defendant Nugent did not state any reasons for his summary denial on the peremptory
challenge form.
51. Defendant Nugent did, however, strike a statement on the local court peremptory 
challenge form by drawing a line through the entire statement.  The statement states:
“This case is referred to Presiding/Supervising Department for re-assignment and a
Notice will be mailed to counsel.”
52. Attached to plaintiff’s Peremptory Challenge form was plaintiff’s Motion and 
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Declaration/Exhibits to disqualify defendants Strauss and Weber for cause (i.e.,
disability discrimination) from reassignment of plaintiff's case to another judge,
should defendant Nugent grant plaintiff’s challenge.
53. C.C.P. § 170.6 (3) states that:
“…In other cases, the trial of the cause or the hearing of the matter shall be assigned
or transferred to another judge… or if there is not other judge… the Chair of the
Judicial Council shall assign some other judge… to try the matter as promptly as
possible.” 
The purpose of plaintiff's Motion was to attempt to invoke the "principle of check" by
having an unbiased judge assign the matter for trial, if necessary. 
54. On December 8, 2003, defendant Nugent struck plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify Judges 
Weber and Strauss in its entirety, stating that such motion is without precedent in
"California jurisprudence."   
a.
Defendant Nugent's December 8, 2003 Order striking plaintiff's Motion
disclosed for the first time that plaintiff's peremptory challenge had been
denied on the grounds that it was "untimely."  Defendant Nugent's December
5, 2003 denial of plaintiff's Peremptory Challenge neither stated nor made any
reference to "untimely."  
b.
Plaintiff would not have known why defendant Nugent had denied her
peremptory challenge had she not filed her Motion to Disqualify defendants
Weber and Strauss.  Cognizant that defendant Nugent might seize upon
"timeliness" as a pretext to deny her Peremptory Challenge, in her August 4,
2003 complaint, plaintiff had reserved her right to make a peremptory
challenge. Plaintiff's challenge was contingent upon defendant Strauss'
investigation of defendant Nugent's bias.  Defendant Strauss refused to
investigate or to refer the matter for investigation.  
c.
Plaintiff's challenge was timely, as she was forced to discover facts by
enduring defendant Nugent's endless gauntlet of coercion, retaliation and
discrimination.
d.
Plaintiff's Peremptory Challenge and Motion to Disqualify defendants Weber
and Strauss reflect undisputed factual findings of the existence and
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encouragement of blatant bias, prejudice, discrimination, duress, coercion and
retaliation by Judges and the Court against disabled litigants. 
Defendants Strauss and Weber continue to violate the local court's policy against bias,
California Rule of Court 989.3, and the Americans with Disabilities Act.  Absent their
disqualification, these judges and their colleagues on the San Diego Superior Court
will assure that retaliatory reassignment occurs in plaintiff's case in order to attempt to
extend their cover-up of deliberate indifference to and discriminatory animus against
plaintiff and all disabled litigants, which has caused unconscionable duress and
substantial injury, including unspeakable humiliation 
55. On December 5, 2003, David Yamasaki, Assistant Executive Officer, San Diego 
Superior Court, North County Center, admitted in a letter to plaintiff (with a copy to
William C. Vickrey, Director, Administrative Office of the Courts) that defendant San
Diego Superior Court due to “an enormous budget crisis” is intentionally not acting
“as contemplated by the Americans with Disabilities Act.”  
a.
Defendant Superior Court's “enormous budget crisis” excuse for intentionally
violating the ADA is a lame pretext.  This Court has never applied its will or
resources to even attempt to comply with the ADA, especially during the
halcyon years of the 1990’s, during which government entities enjoyed
enormous surpluses.  On January 9, 2004, Governor Schwarzenegger budgeted
$2.9 billion for the Judicial Branch, with $2.2 billion for the trial courts,
including the San Diego Superior Court (the State's second largest court
system). 
b.
Additionally, a review of other California Superior Court websites reveals that
many of them, including Los Angeles, Orange, San Francisco, Kern, Sonoma
and Alameda Counties are currently attempting compliance despite the
“enormous budget crisis.”  Their budgetary process affirmatively implements
ADA mandates.  Defendant San Diego Court's non-compliance reflects the
importance of optional expenditures (e.g., judges' travel and other perquisites)
over ADA mandates to accommodate disabled litigants. 
c.
In January, 1997, defendant Judicial Council’s subcommittee on Access for
Persons with Disabilities conducted a survey of Court Users, Attorneys and
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Court personnel.  The Survey’s Qualitative Interview with a member of
defendant San Diego Superior Court’s Committee for Persons with Disabilities
in San Diego County elicited a troubling conclusion:
“Unfortunately the old way of doing things continues.  No deep
thinking/attention has been done beyond the superficial physical access
issue.  Locally, the court administration hasn’t given such matters deep
thought.”
d.
Evidently, defendant San Diego Superior Court’s “deep thought” resulted in
abolishing this Committee in order to permit judges and the Court to violate
the civil rights of disabled litigants and attorneys at will without detection,
without scrutiny and without remedy.  Defendant judges served on the Court,
when the Committee was abolished.
e.
Although defendant San Diego Superior Court's ADA Coordinator position is
presently occupied by Ms. Kathy Abbott (who also writes grants), Mr.
Yamasaki advised plaintiff not to contact her until "next summer," when it can
be determined whether defendant Court will choose to implement legally
required ADA mandates.  Misuse of ADA specific funding constitutes fraud.
f.
Mr. Yamasaki reiterated defendant Strauss’ position (as stated in his
September 18, 2003 letter to plaintiff) in that he confirmed that defendant
Strauss' duties do not include a responsibility to investigate charges of bias,
prejudice and discrimination against disabled persons by a judicial colleague,
opining that:
“His duties are set forth in California Rule of Court, Rule 6.603. 
I can only confirm that this information is correct.”
g.
Both Mr. Yamasaki (at defendant Superior Court) and defendant Vickrey (at
the Administrative Office of the Courts) believe that compliance with the
ADA, California Government Code § 11135 and other disability laws by
Judges and Court staff is optional, not mandatory and are deliberately
indifferent to plaintiff's ADA rights and protections.  If ADA compliance is
optional, then all Judges' compliance with Canon 3 (B)(5) and (6) against bias
is optional.  Defendant Nugent’s bias and prejudice are officially condoned,
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although his conduct violates the stated policy of defendant Judicial Council of
California, and the policy of its Committee on Access and Fairness.
h.
Defendant Strauss’ voting membership on the Judicial Council of California,
given his express statement that it is not his duty to investigate complaints of
prejudice and bias against another judge, (in violation of defendant San Diego
local court rules and Canons of Judicial Ethics) provides evidence that
defendant Judicial Council's written policies and rules against bias, prejudice
and discrimination in the California State Courts are fraudulent
misrepresentations to the public.
i.
Plaintiff has relied on defendant San Diego Superior Court local policies and
defendant Judicial Council Policies and Court Rules to her detriment, which
has caused unconscionable duress and substantial injury.
56. On December 11, 2003, Plaintiff's caregiver submitted plaintiff's Second Request for
Accommodations (Form MC-410) to defendant Nugent.
a.
Plaintiff attempted to comply with defendant Nugent's illegal "specificity"
requirement.
b.
Plaintiff requested that the Initial Case Management Conference, scheduled for
December 19, 2003, be continued to mid to late January, 2003, as she could not
meaningfully participate and that she would be put at risk of osteoporotic fracture
due to an episode of increased pain and fatigue.
c.
On December 5, 2003, plaintiff had notified defendant Nugent that this
accommodation may be required.  
57. On December 13, 2003, plaintiff made a written request for accommodation for her 
polio disability to Presiding Justice Judith McConnell of the Fourth District Court of
Appeals, regarding an extension of time to submit a writ petition to vacate defendant
Nugent's rulings and to disqualify him from plaintiff's case:             
"Enclosed please find my Request for Accommodations by Persons with Disabilities
and Order Form.  (Enclosure No.1)  I am totally disabled by polio and require broad
reasonable accommodations for myself and my care giver in order to be able to
access the Court to submit a Petition for Writ of Mandate.  I am requesting
assistance prior to the filing of my Petition to notify the Court in advance of my
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needs, promoting the solution of problems before they occur by engaging in the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA’s) “interactive process.”
58.  Plaintiff advised defendant McConnell that Form MC-410 (mandated by California 
Rule of Court 989.3) is not in compliance with the ADA:
"As a former federal investigator, who has enforced anti-discrimination and equal
opportunity laws, I am advising you of discriminatory deficiencies that adversely affect
judges' review and approval of requests for accommodations.
a.
As one can determine by reviewing the form, the Request Form, itself, does not
provide sufficient space to include all “specific” relevant information demanded
in any category, especially if the person must print rather than type the
information or if the information cannot be summarized or abbreviated
The
form construction itself is a barrier to access for disabled persons.  
b.
The eight (8) point font-size, used throughout the form, is a barrier for the sight
impaired and elderly.  Some form instructions are less than eight (8) point.  The
Superior Court’s requirement for litigant filings is a 12 point font-size.  The
parties who designed and approved Form MC-410 – Cal. Rules of Court re: rule
989.3 did not accommodate the needs of a large class of disabled persons, even
in the form's instructions.
c.
The spaces (less than 1/2” each), to which disabled persons are misled to believe
that they must conform in providing information, are insufficient to accommodate
the person's written statements.
d.
No statement on the form declares that the request for accommodation may be
oral (pursuant to ADA and Rule 989.3) or instructs the applicant to contact the
ADA Coordinator (or other designated official) to make an oral request.
e.
The form discourages use of an addendum, as it is not mentioned in the 
      
instructions.
f.
The form itself does not comply with Rule of Court 989.3, which states that the
applicant should “describe,” not “specify” requested accommodations.  Once
parties have "described" their needs, it is the Court’s duty to make proactive          
inquiries and to inform litigants of specific accommodations, programs, services
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and other resources available to them by implementing the ADA's “interactive
process.”
g.
The ADA prohibits denial of a request for accommodations on the basis 
that the request does not conform to Rule 989.3 instructions or criteria that are
vague, unreasonable and otherwise discriminatory.
h.
The form’s construction and instructions require that disabled persons
accommodate the form, rather than assuring that the form accommodates the
needs of disabled persons.  The form produces procedural and substantive
conditions of unconscionability that violate the rights of disabled persons."
59. Plaintiff further stated to defendant McConnell that:
a.
" I am extremely concerned that my disability (identified at item No. 4 of the
Request Form), in tandem with the aforementioned Superior Court’s judge's
discrimination may prevent me or has prevented me from strict compliance
with Court procedures and deadlines through no fault of my own. 
Noncompliance with the ADA and California Rule of Court 989.3, by judges,
Court Executive Officers and other persons/entities may result in wrongful
denial of my Petition on strictly procedural grounds without considering its
merits in violation of my rights."  
b. "I have reviewed the Appeals Court’s website numerous times and have not 
found any reference whatsoever to disability or accommodations for disability,
or any reference to the Americans with Disabilities Act and California Rule of
Court 989.3. Your Court’s information regarding original Writ procedures is
minimally informative.  A disabled person, especially suffering from my
severe impairments, must be assisted by the Court, or it is more likely than not,
that the person’s right to access your Court may be violated. "
60. On December 17, 2003 plaintiff filed a Statement of Disqualification to disqualify 
defendant Nugent pursuant to CCP §170.3, declaring and providing undisputed facts
that he had discriminated against plaintiff on the basis of her disabilities and had
engaged in a pattern of coercion and retaliation against her for filing formal
complaints against him. 
a.
The ADA prohibits coercion and retaliation against disabled persons   
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for exercising their rights.  The burden was on defendant Nugent to justify his
actions, once plaintiff had established a prima facie case.  The totality of
Defendant Nugent’s conduct, including his refusal to interact with plaintiff and
pretextual denial of reasonable accommodation, in addition to his imposition of
monetary sanctions for requesting an Order to Compel DMHC's ADA
compliance, constituted both deliberate indifference and discriminatory
animus.  This is confirmed by undisputed facts and is reinforced by
overwhelming direct and circumstantial evidence.
b.
Defendant Nugent’s refusal to engage in the ADA’s interactive process to
determine how plaintiff could ever satisfy his undisclosed criteria regarding
"specificity" constitutes substantial direct evidence that making satisfactory
requests to him is a futile endeavor.
c.
Plaintiff’s disclosure of her impairments requiring defendant Nugent’s
accommodation (i.e., polio, intractable pain and osteoporosis) supported
approval of her broad request and extensive engagement in the ADA
interactive process.  Defendant Nugent knew, or should have known, that
plaintiff’s disabilities precluded her submission of a separate request for each
required accommodation, throughout the entire conduct of the lawsuit before
him, without extraordinary and unnecessary effort, which would inevitably
diminish due to his future discrimination, coercion and retaliation.  
d.
Failure to accommodate also served defendant Nugent's nefarious purpose of
dismissing plaintiff’s underlying Constitutional claims (e.g., "gagging") in her
state court litigation with prejudice, as evidenced by his rulings and conduct
and as DMHC seeks to do in its Initial Case Management Statement.
e.
Defendant Nugent is an experienced jurist who has been educated by defendant
Administrative Office of the Courts in ADA compliance.  Plaintiff has provided
substantial direct and circumstantial evidence that he has intentionally subjected
an in Pro Per Plaintiff with severe disabilities to unconscionable coercion and
retaliation for exercising her Constitutional and civil rights. 
f.
Plaintiff's Peremptory Challenge and Motion to Disqualify defendants Weber
and Strauss reflect undisputed factual findings of the existence and
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encouragement of deliberate indifference, bias, prejudice, discriminatory
animus, duress, coercion and retaliation by Judges and the Court against the
against disabled litigants, by refusing to investigate complaints in violation of
local court policy and ADA.  
g.
Plaintiff renewed her Motion to Disqualify Judges Strauss and Weber for
Cause and Declaration of Jacquelyn Finney/Exhibits in Support of Motion,
which had been stricken by defendant Nugent and incorporated all facts made
therein into her Statement of Disqualification.
h.
Defendants Strauss and Weber have continued to violate the local court's
policy against bias, California Rule of Court 989.3, and the Americans with
Disabilities Act.  Absent their disqualification, defendant judges and their
colleagues on defendant San Diego Superior Court will assure that retaliatory
reassignment occurs in plaintiff's case in order to attempt to extend their cover-
up of deliberate indifference to and discriminatory animus against plaintiff and
all disabled litigants.   
61. On the afternoon of December 18, 2003 (one day subsequent to the receipt of 
plaintiff's Statement of Disqualification and one day before the Case Management
Conference), defendant Nugent's clerk Al Lum telephoned plaintiff's caregiver and
informed him that defendant Nugent had granted plaintiff's December 11, 2003
request for accommodation to change the date of the Initial Case Management
Conference from December 19, 2003 to January 23, 2004.
a.  Defendant Nugent had delayed approval of plaintiff's request for eight (8) 
days, not responding until plaintiff had filed her Statement of Disqualification
on the previous day, reflecting his coercive and retaliatory practice of causing
plaintiff unconscionable duress in that:
(1)  If she had refused to attend the December 19, 2003 Conference, 
defendant Nugent had the power to impose additional monetary and
other sanctions, including dismissal of her case.  On July 24, 2003,   
defendant Nugent had sanctioned plaintiff $1119.00 for requesting a   
protective order compelling DMHC attorneys to accommodate her   
polio disability. 
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                              (2)  If she had attended the Conference, she would be subjected to risk of 
osteoporotic fracture, intractable pain, and fatigue, all of which would
have caused intolerable distress, negatively affecting her self-advocacy
of her litigation.  
b.   Had plaintiff suffered osteoporotic fractures, not only would her in pro 
per lawsuit be ended, she would be put in the position of  having to comply
under duress with unconscionable HMO contract conditions that require prior
restraint on her speech in her doctor-patient relationships to obtain treatment
for the fractures.
c.   DMHC's legal position to license HMOs that form unconscionable contracts    
of adhesion with subscribers would prevent her from the guarantee of the
rights and protections of the Knox-Keene Act (solely enforced by DMHC with
no private right of action) in violation of her Constitutional and civil rights
without meaningful access to the state's courts for writ review, due to their
discrimination stratagem against disabled persons. 
62. On the morning of December 19, 2003, Mr. Lum telephoned plaintiff's caregiver to set 
a time for the January 23, 2004 Case Management Conference.  He stated that DMHC
staff counsel, Patricia Sturdevant, was on-site and present in the Court.  
a.   Defendant Nugent's eleventh hour decision to grant plaintiff's request for 
accommodation (submitted on December 11, 2003) had caused Ms. Sturdevant
to travel from Sacramento to San Diego unnecessarily.  
b.
Defendant Nugent's conscious disregard for plaintiff's rights has also 
contributed to Governor Schwarzenegger's budget crisis, which was the subject
of a recent meeting between the governor and the Chief Justice of the
California Supreme Court regarding funding for the courts, which defendants
maintain is necessary to act "as contemplated" by ADA.  
63. On December 20, 2003 plaintiff received defendant Nugent's order granting her 
second request for accommodation. He granted the request because "it does not create
and undue burden on the court."  
a. 
Although he had denied plaintiff's first request because it "does not satisfy the
requirements of the rule (989.3)," he did not grant her second request on the
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basis that she "satisfies the requirements of the rule."  Although the request
form provides for granting a request on the latter basis, defendant Nugent did
not check that box or indicate in any other manner that plaintiff had satisfied
Rule of Court 989.3.
b.
Plaintiff had informed defendant Nugent that Rule of Court 989.3 was
constructed to violate the ADA, protecting judges from scrutiny and
accountability. His failure to grant plaintiff's request on the basis that it
complies with the Rule, may constitute a tacit admission that he recognizes its
illegality.
c.
However, defendant Nugent's failure to acknowledge that plaintiff's request
satisfies the rule may be another retaliatory act that prevents plaintiff from
knowing his secret standards and criteria with which plaintiff must comply in
order to have her future requests granted.
64. On December 22, 2003 plaintiff spoke by telephone with defendant McConnell's 
Clerk, Steve Kelly, regarding approval/denial status of her December 13, 2003 request
for accommodation.  Although plaintiff's request for accommodation plainly stated that
she be provided an extension of a deadline to submit her Writ Petition to defendant
Appeals Court, Mr. Kelly was not delegated the authority to approve or deny plaintiff's
request.  Mr. Kelly stated that he is not an attorney.  He agreed to inquire into the
matter of approval or denial and to telephone plaintiff.  As of the date of her federal
civil action, plaintiff has had no other communication with defendant Court of Appeals
or with defendant McConnell. Plaintiff's request for accommodations had been
received by defendants on December 15, 2003.  Defendants McConnell and Fourth
District Court of Appeals have shown deliberate indifference to plaintiff's request for
accommodation by their failure to reply to approve or deny the request.
a.
Ignoring the request constitutes discrimination and apparent retaliation in 
conspiracy with defendants San Diego Superior Court, Nugent, Weber, and
Strauss. 
b.
Defendant McConnell served as a judge on defendant San Diego Superior  
Court for many years, rising to the policy making position of Assistant
Presiding Judge.  Defendant McConnell has served for years as a member of
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defendant Judicial Council, making policy which defendants Administrative
Office of the Courts and Vickrey administer.
c.
Mr. Kelly stated that defendant McConnell had found plaintiff's suggestions to
be helpful and that the state court's ADA Coordinator had informed her that no
California Court of Appeals website discloses and otherwise advertises ADA
accommodation.  
d.
Mr. Kelly stated that defendant McConnell had either already acted to revise
defendant court's website to reflect ADA accommodation that day or would
cause the revision within a week.  The name and telephone number of the
ADA coordinator for disability accommodation has been disclosed subsequent
to January 5, 2003, as a result of plaintiff's initiative and perseverance.
e.
Defendant McConnell's advertisement of disability accommodation constitutes 
fraudulent misrepresentation to the public, as she has refused to act to approve
or deny plaintiff's ADA request for over a month.  Plaintiff is a member of a
large class of disabled persons who have relied, are relying on or will rely on
this advertisement and Rule of Court 989.3 to their detriment.
f.
Mr. Kelly stated that defendant McConnell was pleased that plaintiff had
reported these deficiencies to defendant Vickrey, Director, AOC.
  65. The next day, on December 23, 2003 @ 8:06 a.m., Defendant Nugent's clerk, Al Lum, 
telephoned plaintiff to inform her that defendant Nugent had scheduled a Status
Conference for January 6, 2004. 
a.
Plaintiff asked what the subject of the Status Conference would be, how it
related to the Initial Case Management Conference and why the Status
Conference was called before the Initial Case Management Conference.  He
replied that he did not know.
b.
Plaintiff strongly objected to the date of the Status Conference, as it violated
defendant Nugent's December 18, 2003 approval of her request for
accommodation to move the date of the Case Management Conference from
December 19, 2003 to January 23, 2004.
c.
Plaintiff stated that defendant Nugent's action constituted further coercion and
retaliation, as she had filed her statement of disqualification to remove
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defendant Nugent from her case on December 17, 2003, and that he was
intentionally risking her health and safety.
d.
Plaintiff orally made a third request for accommodation to combine the Status
Conference and Case Management Conference, holding them both on the date
scheduled for the Case Management Conference on January 23, 2004.
e.
Mr. Lum agreed to inform defendant Nugent of plaintiff's request and to
telephone plaintiff.
f.
The fact that defendant Nugent had decided to schedule a "Status Conference"
(on the same day that plaintiff spoke with defendant McConnell's clerk
regarding ADA accommodations to submit an appeal of defendant Nugent's
rulings) creates a strong presumption of communication and conspiracy
between defendants Nugent and McConnell and/or other defendants and/or
their agents, regarding a collaborative strategy to violate plaintiff's ADA and
Constitutional rights and protections.
g.
This presumption is confirmed by the fact that defendant McConnell has not
acted to approve or deny plaintiff's ADA request for accommodation from its
submission on December 13, 2003 to the present date.  On December 22, 2003,
her clerk had promised to contact plaintiff regarding action on the
accommodation. 
66.  On December 23, 2003 @ 10:00 a.m. Mr. Lum telephoned plaintiff to inform her that 
defendant Nugent had granted plaintiff's third request for accommodation.
a.   Plaintiff again inquired as to the subject of the Status Conference, stating that
      defendant Nugent had not responded to her Statement of Disqualification. 
b.   Plaintiff stated that defendant Nugent's discrimination, coercion and retaliation 
were causing intractable physical pain and emotional duress and that she            
wanted defendant Nugent's response to her statement to disqualify him.
c.   The clerk stated that he believed that the Status Conference was set to discuss 
defendant Nugent's response to plaintiff's Statement of Disqualification, a
course of action neither implied by nor expressly provided pursuant to CCP §
170.3.
67. On December 27, 2003, plaintiff received defendant Nugent's order dated December  
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22, 2003 striking her Statement of Disqualification as a "matter of law."  Defendant
Nugent regarded plaintiff's facts to support her request to disqualify all judges of
defendant San Diego Superior Court as "a conspiracy" theory, the connotation of
which clearly disparaged plaintiff's mental competency.
a.   Defendants Nugent, Strauss, Weber and McConnell were judges in 1996 at    
      defendant San Diego Superior Court, when its Presiding Judge, two other  
Superior Court judges and an attorney were prosecuted by the U.S. Department
of Justice.  They were convicted of a federal RICO bribery conspiracy to fix
verdicts.
b.  The facts presented in this lawsuit conform to the analytical framework for 
conspiracy constructed by the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (Mendocino
Environmental Center v. Mendocino County 192 F.3d 1283 (9th Cir. 1999),
which ruled that government employees had conspired to chill the free speech 
rights of persons of ordinary firmness.
c.
A separate underlying conspiracy may exist in which other parties, acting as
brokers between DMHC and defendants Nugent, Weber, Strauss, and San Diego
Superior Court, caused the court to engage in extreme and illegal actions to
support violation of ADA.  
d.
The purpose of the underlying conspiracy would be to prevent scrutiny of and
legal remedy for the violation of plaintiff's rights (and the rights of all HMO
patients) by imposing unlawful prior restraint on plaintiff's speech in the context
of her doctor-patient relationships as a precondition to access state mandated and
contractual HMO medical benefits.
68. On January 8, 2004, plaintiff received Notices from defendant San Diego Superior   
      Court.
a.
A Notice dated January 5, 2004 informed plaintiff that defendant Nugent had
reconsidered his decisions striking her peremptory challenge (pursuant to
C.C.P. § 170.6) and her statement of disqualification (pursuant to C.C.P. §
170.3).  Defendant Nugent stated:
"This Court has reconsidered the materials filed by plaintiff relative to the
disqualification of Judge Thomas P. Nugent and finds as follows:  Plaintiff
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has developed an abiding belief that this Court is biased against her.  Her
opinion is untrue, unfortunate and inconsistent with this Court's
commitment to ensure that, at the conclusion of the proceedings, all
litigants, regardless of the result, believe they were treated fairly. 
Therefore, pursuant to C.C.P. section, 170.1(a)(A), this Court hereby
recuses itself on the ground this recusal will further the interests of justice. 
All further dates are vacated."  
b.
A Notice dated January 7, 2004 informed plaintiff that her case had been
reassigned to Judge Lisa Guy-Schall, a judge of defendant San Diego Superior
Court, The North County Regional Center.
c.
The Notices did not address plaintiff's undisputed statements in her motions to
disqualify defendants Strauss and Weber from making the reassignment of
another judge on the basis that they have violated ADA and defendant Court's
own policy on bias and have conspired with other defendants to discriminate,
coerce and retaliate against plaintiff. 
d.
Plaintiff objects to the reassignment of her case to Judge Guy-Schall on the
basis that defendants have not disclosed the decision-maker(s) who reassigned
her case to Judge Guy-Schall.  Plaintiff had made two motions to disqualify
defendants Strauss and Weber from making the reassignment. 
e.
Plaintiff further objects to the reassignment of her case to Judge Guy-Schall in
that, should she also retaliate against plaintiff for exercising her rights in order
to protect her colleagues and the Court, defendants' refusal to investigate and
to provide plaintiff remedies for bias, discrimination, coercion and retaliation
will result in further injury and harm to plaintiff.
f.
On October 14, 1999, Judge Guy-Schall was publicly admonished by the
California Commission on Judicial Performance for abusing her contempt
power to deprive a litigant of her "fundamental liberty interest without all of
the procedural safeguards normally accompanying such a deprivation."  Judge
Guy-Schall sentenced a woman to five (5) days in jail without informing her
that she was in contempt, failing to give her a chance to respond to the
contempt order and finding her in contempt in her absence.  Four years elapsed
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between the incident and the admonishment of Judge Guy-Schall.  Like
defendant Nugent, she "acknowledged no problems in her handling of this
matter."  
g.
Defendants' rules, policies, procedures, guidelines, practices and conduct
intentionally discriminate against plaintiff and violate her Constitutional and
civil rights.  Defendants will continue to harm and injure plaintiff and all
disabled persons, absent the relief requested in this lawsuit's Prayer. 
69. By reason of the foregoing allegations, there exists a justiciable controversy with 
respect to which plaintiff is entitled to the relief prayed for herein.  Plaintiff has filed
undisputed meritorious complaints concerning discrimination, coercion and retaliation
on the basis of her disability, using the complaint mechanisms established by
California law, which has been constructed to violate and intentionally violates ADA,
Title II.
70. Defendants have both ignored and denied plaintiff's complaints as a  "matter of law," 
budgetary priority and due to other unstated reasons, providing no remedy for repeated
violations of her rights and have coerced and retaliated against her for submitting
complaints.  Plaintiff's facts have never been disputed. 
71. Defendants' conduct, as set forth herein, violates clearly established federal law. 
72. Denial of services and programs as fundamental as access to state courts severely
impedes plaintiff and all disabled persons from full and equal enjoyment of the rights
of citizenship in a free society.  In particular, denial of access to this state court results
in violation of her right to petition to remedy the denial of state-mandated health care
benefits absent plaintiff's consent to unconscionable prior restraint on her speech in the
context of her doctor-patient relationships.  For these injuries, plaintiff is entitled to
damages in the amount to be determined according to proof.
73. Defendants have seriously injured plaintiff in other ways as well.  Plaintiff's injuries
include, without limitation, frustration, humiliation, physical pain and suffering and
harm to her Constitutional rights. 
74. Defendants have admitted that they are acting intentionally "…not as contemplated by
the Americans with Disabilities Act." 
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75. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that defendants conspired
and intentionally have acted in bad faith, with malice and oppression, and with
reckless indifference for plaintiff's rights under federal law by their acts and omissions
set forth herein.
76. Defendants are continuing to discriminate, coerce and retaliate against plaintiff based
on her disability by denying meaningful access to state court, resulting in ongoing and
irreparable injury to plaintiff.  Defendants' conduct supports this Court's application of
the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" doctrine.  Absent the complete relief
requested, there is a reasonable expectation that plaintiff and all disabled persons will
be subjected to the same conduct again.
77. Plaintiff has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law.  Pecuniary relief alone will
not afford her complete relief for the ongoing acts and omissions complained of
herein.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq.
Against All Defendants 
78. The factual allegations of the foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein by reference. 
79. Title II of the ADA provides that no qualified individual with a disability shall, by
reason of such disability be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of
the services, programs or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination
by any such entity.  42 U.S.C § 12132, et seq.; 28 C.F.R. pt. 35. 
80. The regulations implementing Title II of the ADA provide that no private or public
entity shall discriminate against any individual because that individual has opposed
any act or practice made unlawful by this part, or because that individual made a
charge, testified, assisted or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding
or hearing under the Act or this part.  42 U.S.C. § 12132 et seq; 28 C.F.R. pt.
35.134(a).
81. The regulations implementing Title II of the ADA provide that no private or public
entity shall coerce, intimidate, threaten or interfere with any individual in the exercise
or enjoyment of, or on account of his or her having exercised or enjoyed, or on
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account of her or her having aided or encouraged any other individual in the exercise
or enjoyment or, any right granted or protected by the Act or this part. 42 U.S.C. §
12132 et seq., 28 C.F.R. pt. 35.134(b).
82. The regulations implementing Title II of the ADA provide that public entities such as
defendants Superior Court, Fourth District Appeals Court, Administrative Office of
the Courts and the Judicial Council of California may not utilize methods of
administration that have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing the
accomplishment of the public entity's program with respect to individuals with
disabilities.  28 C.F. R. § 35.130(b)(3)(iii),
83. The regulations implementing Title II of the ADA provide that public entities such as
defendants Superior Court, Fourth District Court of Appeals, Administrative Office of
the Court, and the Judicial Council of California may not place a surcharge on a
particular individual with a disability or any group of individuals with disabilities in
the form of a $655.00 Appeals Court filing fee (i.e., a "court tax") to:
a. 
file complaints against and disqualify judges who discriminate against disabled 
   
persons, 
b. 
vacate their discriminatory, retaliatory rulings, 
Disabled persons are not required to cover the costs of measures, such as program
accessibility, that are required to provide that individual or group with the
nondiscriminatory treatment required by the Act or subpart 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(f).
84. The regulations implementing Title II of the ADA provide that public entities may not 
aid or perpetuate discrimination against a qualified person with a disability by
providing significant assistance to an agency, organization or person that discriminates
on the basis of a disability in providing any aid, benefit or service to the beneficiaries
of the public entities' programs, including all defendants and DMHC.  28 C.F.R. §
35.130(b)(1)(v).
85. Plaintiff is a qualified individual with disabilities within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §
12131(2).
86. Defendants Nugent, Weber, Strauss, McConnell, Vickrey, San Diego Superior Court,
Fourth District Court of Appeals (Division One), Administrative Office of the Courts
and The Judicial Council of California have violated the ADA by, among other things,
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excluding plaintiff from and denying plaintiff the benefits of the California State
Courts on the basis of her disability, as more fully set forth above. 
87. In all of this, defendants have acted under color of state law, regulation, usage or
ordinance and in concert with one another to deprive plaintiff and to threaten to
deprive plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured to her regarding free
speech and right to petition by the First Amendment and to access and due process by
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1983.  Defendant public entities are "persons" subject to suits within the
meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and are liable for the acts and omissions of themselves,
and/or their employees, and have either delegated or ratified their discriminatory acts.
88. In all of this defendants have acted under color of state law, regulation, usage or
ordinance, in concert with one another, and by conspiracy among them, have caused
plaintiff to be denied her Constitutional right to petition the court and right to due
process of law by subjecting her to legally unjustified and discriminatory state laws,
policies, procedures, practices and actions to deprive her of meaningful access to the
state court to enforce her underlying First Amendment U.S. and California
Constitutional right to free speech without prior restraint imposed by DMHC and
Kaiser to access contract medical benefits.  Defendants had knowledge of and
participated in the conspiracy to violate plaintiff's ADA and U.S. Constitutional rights
and had knowledge of the violations committed and had power to prevent and remedy
these wrongs, but neglected and refused to do so in violation of 42 U.S.C § 1985(3).  
89. Defendants' acts were done in knowing violation of plaintiff's legal and Constitutional
rights and have directly and proximately caused plaintiff physical injury, humiliation,
and distress. 
90. These violations of the ADA have harmed and will continue to harm plaintiff and
other disabled persons in the future.
91. Pursuant to the remedies, procedures and rights set forth in U.S.C. § 12133, plaintiff
prays for judgment is set forth below. 
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SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794
Against All Defendants 
92. The factual allegations of the foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein by
reference.
93. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act ("Section 504")  states that "…no otherwise
qualified individual with a disability… shall, solely by reason of her disability, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefit of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance…" 
29 U.S.C. § 794.
94. Regulations implementing Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provide that a
"recipient may not, directly or through contractual or other arrangements, utilize
criteria or methods of administration: (i) That have the effect of subjecting qualified
handicapped persons to discrimination on the basis of disability; [or] (ii) That have the
purpose of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of
the recipient's program with respect to handicapped persons…"  
45 C.F. R § 84.4(b)(4).
95. Plaintiff is a qualified individual with a disability within the meaning of the Section 
504 and its implementing regulations.
96. By virtue of their above-described failure to afford plaintiff reasonable 
accommodations and/or accessibility to their facilities, services, activities and/or
programs in addition to coercion and retaliation for making complaints against
defendants on the basis of disability discrimination, defendants utilize methods of
administration that have the effect of subjecting individuals with disabilities to
discrimination.
97. Defendants' violations of Section 504 have harmed and will continue to harm plaintiff.
98. Accordingly, plaintiff is entitled to relief, as set forth in the wherefore clause below.
99. By virtue of the foregoing actions and omissions of defendants, under color of law and 
      official policy, defendants' practice and custom, have denied and have conspired to 
deny plaintiff her rights to due process and access to the courts guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and her right to petition the courts
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guaranteed by the First amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  These claims are
actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C § 1985.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Violation of Article 1, Section 7(a) of the California Constitution
Against All Defendants 
    100. The factual allegations of the foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein by 
reference. 
    101. The California Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of free access to the 
courts as an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition.  "Free access to the courts 
is an important and valuable aspect of an effective system of jurisprudence, and a 
party possessing a colorable claim must be allowed to assert it without fear of 
suffering a penalty more severe than that typically imposed on defeated parties."  In
re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637.
102. "The state has a constitutional obligation to provide a hearing …before an impartial 
       and disinterested decision-maker satisfies the two central concerns of procedural due 
process, the prevention of unjustified or mistaken deprivations and the promotion of    
participation and dialogue by affected individuals in the decision-making process."    
Coleman v. Department of Personnel Administration 52 Cal.3d 1121.
     103. Defendants' imposition of Appeals Court filing fees (a "court tax") for writ review of
discrimination, coercion and retaliation by judges against disabled persons pursuant    
to CCP § 170 and Rule of Court 989.3 not only violate the U.S./California    
Constitutions and ADA, but also discourage the exercise of the right to a due process  
hearing by plaintiff on her legitimate complaints.  A measure implemented for the 
sake of efficiency cannot jeopardize the integrity of the judicial process.  Jovine v.
FHP, Inc (1998) 64 Cal.App.4
th
1506.  Rule of Court 989.3 and C.C.P. § 170 place 
"burdensome hoops upon disabled persons seeking a meaningful opportunity to be 
heard before the Court."  Lammers v Superior Court (2000) Cal.App.4th
.
    104. These Appeals Court filing fees, the ten (10) day timeframe
s
for
submitting writ 
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petitions and the prospect of the imposition of court costs and sanctions will have a
chilling effect upon all disabled persons who wish to make such a challenge of
discrimination, coercion and retaliation by judges.  
a.
Defendant Nugent's repeated wrongful denials, retractions of reasonable
accommodations previously granted, sanctions, coercion and retaliation will
cost plaintiff $655.00 each time plaintiff files a writ petition as is currently
required by C.C.P. § 170 and Rule of Court 989.3.
b.
State law mandating writ petitions within a ten (10) day timeframe to review
and remedy defendant judges' disability discrimination creates a fraudulent
scheme, generating unconstitutional/illegal unjust enrichment in violation of
federal and state law.  
105. "A litigant's non-frivolous assertion of a procedural right may not be chilled through 
fear of subsequent reprisals in the form of monetary penalties.  The prospect of
liability for hearing costs could cause [teachers] to limit their defense and forego
vigorous advocacy, even if they are not deterred from demanding a hearing." 
(California Teachers Assn v. State of California (1999) 20 Cal.4th 327)
106. Defendants' above-described conduct violates plaintiff's right not to be deprived of  
  access, due process and equal protection laws under Article 1, Section 7(a) of the 
  California Constitution. 
107. Defendants' violations of the California Constitution have harmed and will continue 
  to harm plaintiff.
108. Accordingly, plaintiff is entitled to relief, as set forth in the wherefore clause below.
109. By virtue of the foregoing actions and omissions of defendants, under color of state 
  law and official policy, defendant's practice and custom, have denied and have   
  conspired to deny plaintiff her rights to due process and access to the courts     
  guaranteed by the U.S. and California Constitutions and her right to petition the   
  courts guaranteed by the U.S. and California Constitutions.  These claims are 
  actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985.           
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FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Violation of Article 1, Section 3 of the California Constitution
Against All Defendants
110. The factual allegations of the foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein by 
        reference.
111. The California Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of the right to criticize  
        public entities and government officials by the act of filing a lawsuit. 
112. The California Supreme Court ruled in City of Long Beach v. Bozek (31 Cal. 3d. 527,   
        183 Cal.Rptr. 86, 645 P.2d 137) that:
a.
"The act of filing suit against a government entity represents an exercise of the
right of petition and thus evokes Constitutional protection…"
b.
"The right of petition is of parallel importance to the right of free speech and
other overlapping cognate rights obtained in the First Amendment and in
equivalent provisions of the California Constitution…"
c.
"It is essential to protect the ability of those who perceive themselves to be
aggrieved by the activities of governmental authorities to seek redress through
all channels of government…"
d.
"The bringing of suits against the government is absolutely privileged…"
113. Defendants' violations of the ADA prevent and otherwise violate the exercise of 
plaintiff's right to petition for redress of her grievances regarding unlawful prior  
restraint on her speech in the context of her physician-patient relationships by
DMHC and Kaiser as a precondition to obtain state mandated and contractual
medical benefits.
114. Defendants' violations of the ADA prevent and otherwise violate the exercise of 
plaintiff's right to petition for redress of grievances against DMHC for illegally 
licensing HMOs under the Knox-Keene Act and approving unconscionable    
contracts of adhesion between HMOs and subscribers. 
115. Defendants' above-described conduct violates plaintiff's right not to be deprived of 
  the right to petition under Article I, Section 3 of the California Constitution. 
116. Defendants' violations of the California Constitution have harmed and will continue 
  to harm plaintiff. 
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117. Accordingly, plaintiff is entitled to relief, as set forth in the wherefore clause below.
118. By virtue of the foregoing actions and omissions of defendants, under color of state 
  law and official policy, defendants' practice and custom, have denied and have  
  conspired to deny plaintiff her rights to petition and free speech guaranteed by the 
  U.S. and California Constitutions.  These claims are actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 and 42  U.S.C. § 1985.          
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Violation of California Government Code § 11135
Against All Defendants
119. The factual allegations of the foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein by 
reference.
120. Section 11135(a) of the California Government Code says:
"No person in the State of California shall on the basis of… disability, be 
unlawfully denied full and equal access to the benefits of, or be unlawfully 
subjected to discrimination under, any program or activity that is conducted, 
operated or administered by the state or by any state agency, is funded directly by 
the state, or receives any financial assistance from the state."
121. Plaintiff is a person with disabilities within the meaning of California Government 
Code § 11135. 
122. Pursuant to California Government Code § 77100, "The Legislature finds and 
  declares that :
(b) …all citizens of this state should enjoy equal and ready access to the trial   
     courts…
(d) The method of funding trial courts should not create financial barriers to the
fair and proper resolution of civil... actions…
(e) Many people defend their personal and property rights in the courts, and seek 
      redress through the judicial system only when compelled by sheer necessity of 
circumstance…
(f) The chapter is enacted to promote the general welfare and to protect the public      
      interest in a viable and accessible judicial system." 
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123. In 1997, pursuant to California Government Code § 77200, the state has assumed 
  responsibility for the funding of defendants' operations, as defined in Government   
             Code § 77003 and California Rule of Court 810.  
124. Pursuant to California Government Code § 77001, "The Judicial Council shall adopt 
        rules which establish a decentralized system of trial court management.  These rules  
        shall ensure:…
(e) Equal access to justice throughout California utilizing standard practices and 
procedures whenever feasible."
125. Pursuant to Government Code § 68088, "The Judicial Council may provide by rule
of court for racial, ethnic, and gender bias and sexual harassment training for
judges…"  Disability bias training is conspicuously absent. 
126. Through their acts and omissions described herein, defendants violate California
Government Code § 11135 by denying plaintiff her right to access the state courts to
petition for redress of grievances, which include the imposition of prior restraint on
her speech by DMHC pursuant to an unconscionable HMO contract of adhesion to
obtain state mandated medical benefits. 
127. In so doing, defendants are unlawfully denying plaintiff the benefits of programs,
services and activities, and unlawfully subjecting plaintiff to discrimination under
defendants' programs, services and activities. 
128. Accordingly, plaintiff is entitled to relief, as set forth in the wherefore clause below.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court:
1.   Assume jurisdiction over this action.
2.
Issue a declaratory judgment in favor of plaintiff, against defendants, declaring that
defendants have violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §
12131 et seq. and/or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794
and/or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and/or 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and/or the U.S. and California
Constitutions and/or California Government Code § 11135.
3.
Issue a preliminary and permanent injunction ordering defendants to comply with the
U.S. and California Constitutions and statutes set forth herein.
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4.
Issue a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting defendants from subjecting
plaintiff to state statutes, codes, regulations, rules, policies and practices that violate
her rights, which should include but not be limited to: 
a.
Amending California Code of Civil Procedure § 170 by including a provision,
pertaining to the disqualification of judges who are accused of bias,
discrimination, coercion and retaliation and other illegal acts against persons 
on the basis of a disability, that establishes immediate review by an agency,
independent of California's judicial branch, without requiring strict time limits,
fees, or other illegal barriers.
b.
Declaring California Rule of Court 989.3 unconstitutional and illegal in its
entirety, compelling defendant Judicial Council, at a minimum, to develop and
prominently and conspicuously advertise written policies and procedures
regarding compliance with ADA. 
c.
Establishing a state-wide system requiring each judge and court to collect and
maintain detailed records of all requests for accommodation by disabled
persons by type of accommodation requested, the disposition of all requests for
accommodations by type of accommodation requested, and to publish these
findings on each court's website to be updated monthly.
d.
Establishing and conspicuously publishing written and oral complaint/
grievance policies and procedures to enable each disabled person to submit
timely, meaningful complaints against courts and judges accused of
discrimination, bias, coercion and retaliation.
e.
Establishing and conspicuously publishing clear, consistent and public
discipline policies and procedures in the event complaints and grievances are
sustained.
f.
Appointing an independent auditor who will review the records of courts and
judges quarterly to determine that there is actual compliance with these
reforms and conspicuously publishing investigatory methodologies and all
findings. 
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g.
Requiring that the names and contact information for ADA coordinators for
each court be conspicuously published on each court's website and prominently
displayed at multiple locations in each courthouse.
h.
Requiring that the services and programs of each court and representative
comprehensive corresponding accommodations for each service and program
be conspicuously published on each court's website and prominently displayed
at multiple locations, accessible to the disabled, in each courthouse.
i.
Requiring every judge, upon assignment of a case, to state that disabled
persons are encouraged to request reasonable accommodations by engaging in
the interactive process, in addition to the maximum number of days within
which time the request must be decided. 
j.
Requiring that all judges and court personnel participate in regular and
recurring education to assure that they do not engage in any type of bias,
discrimination, coercion and retaliation against disabled persons. 
5.
Maintain continuing jurisdiction over this action until defendants can prove that they
are in compliance with ADA, Section 504 and every order of this Court.
6.
Award compensatory and general damages for plaintiff against defendants and each of
them, in an amount to be determined according to proof. 
7.
Award plaintiff her costs, expenses and reasonable attorneys fees pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 12205, 28 C.F.R. § 35.175, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) and 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
8.
Order such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Pursuant to Rule 38(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiff demands trial by jury
for all the issues plead herein so triable.
Dated: ___________
Respectfully submitted,
By:  _____________________________
Jacquelyn Finney
Plaintiff, Pro Se